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USING STATUTES TO SET LEGISLATIVE RULES:
ENTRENCHMENT, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS CLAUSE
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl*
INTRODUCTION
In August 2002, President Bush signed an omnibus trade bill that
included, among many other items, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act.1 Trade promotion authority, also known as "fast
track," empowers the administration to negotiate trade agreements
with foreign governments, then submit bills implementing the
agreements to Congress for streamlined consideration. Under fast
track rules, Congress is required to schedule a vote within two
months, and neither chamber may amend the president's
implementing bill. Fast track thus guarantees the president (and
trade partners) a speedy up-or-down decision on the nation's
participation in a free trade agreement. Regaining fast track
authority, which last expired in 1994, had been one of President
Bush's top legislative priorities, just as it had been for President
Clinton.2
Fast track establishes statutory rules of debate that supplant the
internal procedures that otherwise govern each chamber's
consideration of proposed legislation. The legislature's power over
its internal rules is rooted in the Constitution, which provides that
"[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings. '3
Although this clause generates little excitement among constitutional
scholars, and even the Framers gave it scant attention, it grants the
House and Senate a vast power to flesh out the Constitution's mere
skeleton of a legislative process. The Constitution does not prescribe
* Law Clerk to Chief Judge Carolyn Dineen King, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit; J.D., Yale Law School; M.Phil., University of Cambridge. I would like to thank Victoria
Nourse for helpful comments.
1 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
2 See Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Trade Bill, Restoring Broad Presidential Authority, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 7, 2002, at AS; William Claiborne, Lauding Trade, Clinton Urges "Fast Track," WASH.
POST, June 13, 1999, at AS.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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parliamentary procedures, create a committee system, or do any of
the multitude of things necessary for a legislature to function.
Instead, each chamber has typically established these procedures and
internal structures through unilateral resolutions-that is,
resolutions passed by one chamber without the involvement of the
other house or the president. But sometimes, as in the case of the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act and certain other statutes,
the legislature uses a statute to prescribe its internal procedures-
employing what I will call a "statutized rule."
While statutized rules are departures from the usual scheme of
legislative self-governance, they are neither new nor especially rare.
In 1789, the nation's first legislators under the new Constitution
enacted a statute regulating the order of business at the beginning of
new sessions of Congress, a matter that plainly could be regulated
unilaterally under each chamber's rules power.4 Since that time,
Congress has legislated in a number of areas-including committee
membership and jurisdiction,5 punishment for absent members, 6 and
procedures for election contests7 -that could, under specific
constitutional authorizations, be handled through unilateral action
by each house.8 By far the largest category of such legislation consists
of statutes that, like trade promotion authority, govern the rules of
debate for particular types of legislation. There are dozens of such
statutes, some governing matters as weighty as the federal budget and
others concerning relative curiosities like commercial space launch
reinsurance. 9 Such measures, which typically provide for expedited
4 See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
5 See statutes cited infra notes 92 & 94.
6 See2 U.S.C. § 39 (2000).
7 See2 U.S.C. §§ 381-396 (2000).
8 In addition to the Rules of Proceedings power, which encompasses committee structure,
the relevant textual authorization for handling these matters unilaterally is Art. I, § 5, cl. 1:
"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, and [a number less than a quorum] may be authorized to compel the Attendance of
absent Members in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide." See
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing, in addition to the rules power, that "[e]ach House"
may "punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds,
expel a Member").
9 The fast track procedures for trade agreements are codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2191. Other
examples of debate-regulating statutes (some of which are codified and others of which are
present only in the session laws) include the following: 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-645a (2000)
(congressional budget process); 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d-e (legislation containing unfunded
mandates); 5 U.S.C. § 802 (procedures for legislation that nullifies agency regulations); 5
U.S.C. §§ 901-12 (executive reorganization plans); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h) (Senate rules for
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consideration and limit or forbid amendments, appear to be gaining
in popularity, perhaps as a response to the increasingly sclerotic
nature of the usual "slow track" legislative process. 10 Statutized rules'
increasing prevalence can thus be viewed as another manifestation of
the rise of "unorthodox lawmaking" in Congress-that is, the use of
practices that bypass the ordinary legislative path found in civics
texts.1I
Not only do fast track rules offer a way to bypass many of the usual
procedural hurdles, but, when conjoined with a delegation of
authority to the executive branch, a fast track regime can act as a
close substitute for the legislative veto.12 The latter device, declared
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha,13  confers decisionmaking
authority on the executive branch but lets Congress nullify the
executive's decision by subsequently passing a disapproval
legislation adjusting the status of certain aliens); 15 U.S.C. § 719f (procedures for approving
presidential determinations concerning Alaskan natural gas pipelines); 16 U.S.C. § 1823
(procedures for disapproving international fisheries agreements); 29 U.S.C. § 1306(b)
(procedures for considering Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation premium revisions); 42
U.S.C. § 2210(i) (procedures for nuclear accident compensation legislation); 42 U.S.C. § 6249c
(legislation implementing certain petroleum contracts); 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (procedures for
terminating presidentially declared states of emergency); Amtrak Reform and Accountability
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-134, § 205, 111 Stat. 2570, 2582 (Senate procedures for
considering Amtrak restructuring and liquidation plans); Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 518A, 110 Stat.
3009 (1997) (procedures for approving presidential findings regarding population planning
funding); Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, § 208, 102 Stat. 2623, 2632-33 (1988) (procedures for considering
recommendations to close military bases); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7323, 102 Stat. 4181, 4467-68 (Senate procedures for habeas corpus reform legislation); see
also infra note 79 (providing more examples); cf CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES [H.R. DOc. NO. 106-320] § 1130 (Charles W.
Johnson ed., 2001) [hereinafter HOUSE MANUAL] (setting forth the text and applicable
parliamentary interpretations of thirty statutes that confer "privileged" procedural status on
certain resolutions disapproving of executive actions).
10 See Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking, 17J. L. &
POL. 409, 410-12 (2001) (noting the increasing importance of laws structuring the legislative
process).
11 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 2000).
12 The similarity between the two devices is suggested in Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto
After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 792-96 (1984); cf. H.R. REP. No. 98-257, pt. 3, at 3 (1983)
(suggesting that fast track schemes will become more popular in the wake of the Chadha
decision); Tiefer, supra note 10, at 423 (noting that Chadha and the line item veto decisions
increased the importance of the alternative strategy of passing laws that streamline the
legislative process).
13 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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resolution.1 4  Under a fast track scheme, Congress can let the
president (or an administrative agency) make the initial policy
decision, the implementation of which is conditioned on passage of
an administration-drafted confirmatory statute via an expedited up-
or-down vote. Under fast track the legislature must still affirmatively
endorse the executive's chosen policy, but the special procedure
guarantees that the measure comes up for a vote quickly, thus
overcoming the procedural roadblocks that beset the ordinary
legislative process. An effective fast track regime thus reduces the
inertia that stands in the path of passing a law. In terms of
congressional effort, approving the confirmation statute when it
automatically comes up for a vote is not that much more burdensome
than refraining from adopting a legislative veto resolution-or, at
any rate, approving the fast track confirmation statute is certainly
easier than passing normal legislation-and so fast track and the
legislative veto approach a rough equivalence. Yet, constitutionally
speaking, there is all the difference in the world, since a bill passed
under fast track still complies with Article I, Section 7's requirement
of bicameralism and presentment. 15
Given fast track's evident advantages, it is unsurprising that
commentators have advocated extending fast track to a number of
important policy areas that, like trade policy, require close
legislative-executive coordination.16 Congressional interest con-
tinues as well. Demonstrating one of the most far-reaching potential
uses for fast track, the 104th Congress considered (but rejected)
proposals that would require all significant administrative regulations
14 Under different versions of the legislative veto, the disapproval resolution would need to
be passed by both houses, one house, or merely by a committee. The broadly worded decision
in Chadha, together with the Supreme Court's summary dispositions of other cases, see Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); United
States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), make it clear that all forms are impermissible.
15 Leading authorities therefore agree that statutes passed pursuant to such a regime do
not run afoul of Chadha. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 12, at 792-96; Laurence H. Tribe, The
Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name, 21 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 18-20 (1984).
16 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 716-35 (1997) (arguing for extending fast track to arms
control and environmental agreements, but not war powers or foreign assistance); Ronald A.
Lehmann, Note, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A Congressional Fast Track for Arms Control
Treaties, 98 YALE L.J. 885, 896-903 (1989); Vanessa Patton Sciarra, Note, Congress and Arms Sales:
Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure, 97 YALE L.J. 1439, 1453-57 (1988). But
cf Breyer, supra note 12, at 796-98 (expressing skepticism over the wisdom of implementing
such a regime with respect to agency rulemaking).
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to receive approval by Congress, under fast track rules, in order to
take effect.17
The increasing popularity of statutized rules underlines the
importance of understanding the legal and practical issues they raise.
Using statutes to set the rules of debate is in some ways quite
problematic from the perspective of the constitutional lawyer. In
particular, there is good reason to doubt whether a regime of
statutized rules can legally bind a later legislature that wishes to use
different procedures. In fact, Congress itself appears to hold the
view that each house always possesses a constitutionally mandated
power to change its own rules, regardless of what any statute says
about the matter.18 If Congress were correct, that constitutional
reality would render fast track schemes devoid of legal effect. It
would then be something of a puzzle why the president places such
importance on fast track, and why Congress has bothered to pass so
many statutes regulating its internal affairs, when a subsequent vote
in either chamber could abrogate those statutory arrangements. The
statutes could have only political, but not legal, meaning.
Why is a legally effective regime of statutory procedures
considered constitutionally suspect? The consensus view, shared by
Congress and commentators, is that statutized rules are troubling
because they implicate a constitutionally rooted anti-entrenchment
norm that forbids one legislature from binding its successors-in this
case, binding successors to follow particular rules of debate. The
problem with a statute that attempts to govern a subsequent
legislature's procedures, on this view, is the same problem that would
beset a statute that purported to permanently establish spending
limits. Both interfere with the prerogatives of a later (but otherwise
equally dignified) legislature, and so they cannot bind.
In my view, the conventional critique is mistaken. There is a
problem with statutized rules, but it is not that they are entrenching.
Rather, as this Article explains, the true difficulty lies in separation of
powers considerations. When the legislature statutizes the rules of
debate, it gives the president a say in a sphere of activity where,
constitutionally speaking, he should have no voice. Giving the
president a role in setting legislative rules would seriously alter the
17 See Significant Regulation Oversight Act of 1996, H.R. 2990, 104th Cong. (1996);
Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. (1995).
18 See infra Part I.B.
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distribution of policymaking power between the branches and violate
the constitutionally mandated sovereignty of the legislature over its
own internal affairs.
I readily admit that the problem of statutized rules does not look
like what has come to represent the typical separation of powers case.
The dominant modern trend in separation of powers analysis has
been to focus on the Constitution's three Vesting Clauses, which
endow each branch of government with its own characteristic type of
power: legislative, executive, and judicial. The task is then to
determine whether one branch is guilty of performing the "wrong"
function-such as would occur if the president tried to legislate or
Congress sought to execute.1 9 But the functional truisms of the
Vesting Clauses seem to offer little help here, for Congress is still
legislating when it acts under statutized rules, the president is still
executing, and so on. It is wrong, however, to think that the absence
of a functional mismatch is the end of the separation of powers
inquiry. As other scholars have shown, the separation of powers also
resides in clauses that constitutional lawyers tend to overlook. The
Incompatibility Clause and the Appointments Clause, for example,
possess a structural significance that belies their prosaic
appearances.20  So too with the key text here, the Rules of
Proceedings Clause, or at least so I will contend. The Rules of
Proceedings Clause gives practical content to Article I, Section 7, and
as such it plays a crucial role in constituting the inter-branch balance
of policymaking authority.
The analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the practical
problem that fast track is intended to confront and explains how fast
track tries to solve it. As we will see, fast track responds to features of
the legislative process that are common to all types of legislation but
that can have particularly severe consequences in areas like trade. As
Part I also explains, however, fast track's attempts to structure the
legislative process raise questions about whether the Constitution
19 Cf Victoria F. Nourse, Political Relationships and the Separation of Powers, 56 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2003) (decrying the rise of a separation of powers jurisprudence focused on
functional mismatches and the Vesting Clauses).
20 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994) (elaborating separation of powers
implications of the Incompatibility Clause); Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation"for the
Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REv. 447, 472-77, 511-21
(1996) (explaining the centrality of appointment, tenure, and salary).
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would countenance a binding statutized rule. Expressing its own
worries on the matter, Congress typically (though not unfailingly)
includes disclaimers in statutized rules that recognize that either
chamber may unilaterally abrogate the statutory procedures.
Part II explores and questions the conventional wisdom about the
constitutional status of statutized rules like fast track. Congress and
commentators agree that it would be impermissible to bind future
Congresses to follow rules laid down in an earlier statute. Such a
result, they contend, would violate a well-established norm of anti-
entrenchment. I argue that fast track does not have an entrenching
effect or, if it does, that the type of entrenchment it represents is not
as troubling as is ordinarily supposed. To understand the
constitutional problem (if any) with statutized rules, we must look
elsewhere.
Part III, the longest portion of the Article, provides an alternative
theoretical framework for understanding the constitutionally
troubling aspects of statutized rules. The claim is that the Rules of
Proceedings Clause plays an important (if underappreciated) role in
creating a government of separate, independent powers. Allowing
procedures to be set by statute would effect a radical shift in
policymaking power from the legislature to the president, and,
moreover, it would do so in a way particularly offensive to the
Framers' design. The problem with statutized rules, therefore, is not
that they represent a cross-temporal power-grab between one
legislature and a subsequent one-which would implicate the anti-
entrenchment norm-but that they represent an unconstitutional
horizontal shift of power between departments of government. In
some cases, the separation of powers approach to statutized rules
generates different answers on the constitutional merits than does
the entrenchment-based understanding. On the whole, however, the
separation of powers analysis laid out in Part III largely agrees with
the consensus position that statutized rules are constitutionally
suspect; it does, however, seek to provide a more satisfying
theoretical account of why exactly they are troubling.
2003]
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I. How STATUTIZED RULES (DON'T?) WORK
Fast track can be an extremely useful procedural innovation. That
something is convenient and efficient does not mean that it is
constitutionally permissible, of course, for "the Framers ranked other
values higher than efficiency."'21 Indeed, we will see later on that a
legally binding fast track statute might be unconstitutional. The cost
of making fast track constitutional might be to remove the very
feature that would let it accomplish its goals: its power to control
later legislatures. To get a hold on these constitutional questions,
which are explored in Parts II and III of this Article, it is necessary to
see what a fast track statute is supposed to accomplish. Although fast
track statutes exist in a number of policy areas, 22 the fast track system
for trade agreements is likely the most prominent, and so in this Part
of the Article I shall use it as an example of how such regimes
operate. The constitutional issues that these regimes raise are
generally the same across various policy contexts.
The current fast track system for free trade agreements is the
latest of several efforts to strike a workable balance between
legislative and executive control over foreign trade.23 As a matter of
constitutional law, Congress holds the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations,"24 but the modem president's place as the
nation's chief actor in foreign affairs means that the executive
branch has long played a prominent role. For much of the twentieth
century, Congress gave the president authority to negotiate
reciprocal tariff reductions with foreign governments; the new rates
were then established by presidential proclamation, without the need
for further legislative authorization. At the same time, Congress had
been unwilling to give the president so much authority with respect
to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), reductions in which would have a
greater effect on domestic law. Notwithstanding the reluctance of
Congress, administration trade representatives negotiated a number
of sensitive NTB issues during the Kennedy Round of trade
21 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,959 (1983).
22 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23 For an overview of the various regimes that have been attempted over the last century,
see Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1192-1208 (1986). The brief summary provided in
this paragraph of the text draws upon Koh's account.
24 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
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negotiations in the 1960s. Believing that the administration had
overstepped the bounds, Congress then refused to enact some of the
measures the administration had promised to trade partners. That
failure, and the inter-branch conflict that produced it, were widely
regarded as having damaged the credibility of American trade
negotiators.2 5
Chastened by the Kennedy Round experience, and chastened
further by the executive abuses brought to light in the Watergate
scandal, Congress fashioned a new regime in the Trade Act of 1974.26
The 1974 Act is a massive statute, but the important aspect for
present purposes is the way it handles major trade agreements on
NTBs. Reduced to basics, the regime established in the 1974 Act (as
amended by subsequent legislation) authorizes the president to
negotiate free trade agreements that Congress can then approve
using special "fast track" implementation procedures. 27 The trade
pacts have no domestic legal effect unless Congress approves them by
passing them as a statute. For example, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) committed the United States to restore
the copyrights of certain Canadian and Mexican films, but that
commitment only became effective in U.S. law when the NAFTA
Implementation Act amended the Copyright Act.28  A bill
implementing a trade agreement is passed as ordinary bicameral
legislation; it is not treated as a formal "treaty" requiring ratification
by two-thirds of the Senate. 29
25 S. REP. No. 107-139, at 2 (2002); Koh, supra note 23, at 1192-1200.
26 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
27 The authorization is time-limited, so Congress must extend the president's authority
from time to time. The extensions typically incorporate further fine-tunings of the respective
roles of the two branches. For a summary of how the regime has developed over time, see
Carrier, supra note 16, at 700-15.
28 See Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 334, 107 Stat. 2057, 2115 (1994) (adding 17 U.S.C. § 104A).
29 There has been significant scholarly debate over whether major trade agreements may
be implemented as ordinary legislation rather than via the route specified by the Constitution's
Treaty Clause, art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Compare
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995)
(arguing that either route is permissible), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221,
1249-78 (1995) (expressing skepticism about dispensing with the Treaty Clause). Whatever the
constitutional merits, the two methods have in practice come to be viewed as interchangeable
in most cases, with political considerations typically playing the predominant role in selecting
one form rather than the other. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987). The courts have refused to enter the dispute. See
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (abstaining, on
20031 353
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As ordinary legislation, bills implementing trade pacts would be
subject to all of the hurdles of the normal legislative process. As
described in more detail below, the familiar process can prove
especially dangerous to measures like trade agreements. Fast track
regimes, whether in the trade domain or elsewhere, deviate from the
ordinary legislative process by creating streamlined rules that smooth
out the usual bumps. In explaining what fast track does, and why it is
desirable, it is therefore useful to start by comparing it with the
alternative: the "slow track" that characterizes the usual process.
A. The Slow Track and the Fast Track
It is no accident that our system makes it difficult to pass
legislation. Indeed, among the Framers' many goals was the aim of
avoiding what they perceived as an epidemic of excessive lawmaking
in the state legislatures.30  Thus Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution requires that a bill receive the assent of a majority of the
House of Representatives, a majority of the Senate, and the president
(whose negative can be overridden only by supermajorities in both
chambers) before it can become law. 31 As the Supreme Court has
forcefully reaffirmed on several occasions, the Constitution mandates
that federal legislative power be exercised through the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered" path of bicameralism and
presentment, no matter how inconvenient that mandate turns out to
be.3 2
While the requirements of Article I, Section 7 are daunting
enough by themselves, the obstacles erected by the Framers pale in
comparison to those thrown up by Congress's traditions and internal
rules. In one scholar's estimation, a complex piece of legislation has
to achieve as many as fifty to sixty different majorities at various points
in the legislative process before finally finding its way to the
president's desk.33 But unlike Article I, Section 7, these procedural
prudential grounds, from deciding whether NAFTA was subject to the requirements of the
Treaty Clause), cert. denied sub nom. United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 534 U.S. 1039
(2001).
30 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62, 63 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison), No. 73
(Alexander Hamilton).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
32 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 448 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto Act for violating Art. I, Section 7).




barriers are subject to congressional amelioration. It is worth noting
a few salient procedural obstacles in the path of lawmaking, since it is
these barriers at which fast track regimes take aim.3 4
Near the top of any such list would be the committee system.
Although committees are bypassed more frequently now than in the
past,3 5 it is still beyond dispute that most of the work of Congress
occurs in committee. And while Congress could hardly function
without the committee system, the system has the effect of adding an
important set of decisionmakers who ordinarily must sign off on a
bill for it to become law.36 Even when the majority of a committee is
favorably disposed toward a bill, the committee chairman, though a
less powerful figure since the reforms of the 1970s, still has enough
clout effectively to kill bills he or she dislikes by refusing to schedule
them.37 So too can the chairman doom a bill by referring it to a
hostile subcommittee. 38 The vast bulk of bills introduced in Congress
die in committee, often without even a vote. 39
For those lucky bills that do emerge from committee, there is still
the legislative calendar to confront. Most bills would never be
considered on the floor if they were considered in the order in which
they were listed in the calendar. In the House, timely consideration
of proposed legislation thus normally requires that its sponsors
receive a special order (or rule) from the Rules Committee to
34 The account I provide in the next few paragraphs is in no way meant to capture all of the
many nuances and details of legislative procedure. Comprehensive treatments of the subject
include WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS (5th ed.
2001), and CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE,
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (1989). For a briefer but quite detailed description of the
legislative process, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 24-38 (3d ed. 2001).
35 See OLESZEK, supra note 34, at 103-06.
36 There are procedures for discharging bills from a recalcitrant committee, but they are of
limited effect. See, e.g., id. at 88 ("A committee's decision not to report a bill generally will be
respected by the chamber as a whole .... [Procedures for overturning committee decisions]
are employed infrequently and are seldom successful.").
37 Although House and Senate rules permit committee majorities to force the scheduling
of a bill, this is "rarely threatened and almost never attempted." ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 34,
at 28.
38 See ABNERJ. MIKVA & PATrI B. SARmus, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 206 (1983) (discussing
how different subcommittee assignments affected the fate of federal criminal legislation).
39 For statistics on the number of bills introduced, reported from committee, voted upon,
etc. for the 91st Congress through the current Congress, see Resumes of Congressional Activity,
at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/resume/resume.html (last updatedJan. 6, 2003).
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advance it on the calendar. 40 The House Rules Committee itself is
therefore yet another crucial gatekeeping institution. In the Senate,
scheduling is typically handled through unanimous consent
agreements, which, as the name implies, require the assent of each
senator.41
Upon finally reaching the floor, being voted down is hardly the
only way a bill might die. In the Senate, in fact, a determined
minority can prevent a bill from ever coming to a vote at all, for a
motion to end debate on a bill requires sixty votes.42 Though
nowhere dictated by the Constitution, the Senate thus essentially
employs a supermajority voting rule.43
There is reason to believe that the traditional procedural hurdles
canvassed above have been growing higher in recent decades. In the
House, the same reforms that weakened the committee chairmen
have had the result of increasing rank-and-file members' incentives
and resources to engage in lengthy amendment battles.44 Senators
seem to have become less reticent about exploiting their prerogatives
to extend debate and offer extraneous amendments. 45 Filibusters
have become more frequent. 46
40 See OLESZEK, supra note 34, at 120-21. Certain measures, such as budget resolutions and
appropriations bills, enjoy a privileged status that entitles them to expedited consideration. Id.
at 117-18. Measures can also gain speedy consideration through suspension of the rules, but
such a procedure requires a two-thirds majority. HOUSE R. XV; OLESZEK, supra note 34, at 112-
14.
41 See OLESZEK, supra note 34, at 194-202. Though the leadership tries to honor the
objections of individual senators to the extent possible, in the absence of unanimous consent
the majority leader can make a motion to proceed to consideration of the bill, which formally
requires only majority approval. But such motions are generally subject to filibuster. See
TIEFER, supra note 34, at 565-66.
42 See SENATE R. XXII(2). On the filibuster generally, see SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN A.
SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1997); TIEFER,
supra note 34, at 691-766; and, for emphasis on constitutional issues, Catherine Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997).
43 See, e.g., OLESZEK, supra note 34, at 228 ("The Senate . . . is a supermajoritarian
institution, because sixty votes (three-fifths of the membership) are commonly required to
enact major and controversial legislation.").
44 SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 89-98, 108.
45 See id. at 56 ("Senators have always had the right under the rules to talk as long as they
wished, offer multitudes of amendments, and propose nongermane amendments. They have
always used those prerogatives. Yet all the evidence we have indicates that the frequency of
such behavior has increased enormously in recent decades.").
46 BINDER & SMITH, supra note 42, at 6-13; SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 85 tbl.6.1, 98-99. In
recent sessions, at least half of major legislative proposals experienced filibuster-related
problems. SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 99 tbl.6.5. The filibuster has also changed qualitatively.
Rare are the occasions on which a senator will actually hold the floor for hours on end. Most
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The upshot of the foregoing considerations is that every bill must
pass through an increasingly daunting series of choke points-or
"vetogates," as one group of scholars calls them47-each of which
holds out the threat of defeat or at least delay. Each vetogate is also
an opportunity for the relevant decisionmaker to exact an
amendment as the cost of passage. As a result, controversial bills that
manage to survive to enactment frequently bear little resemblance to
the measure originally proposed.
The vetogate-studded character of our legislative process affects all
types of initiatives, not just trade agreements. Yet even so, the risk of
delay, defeat, and amendment is particularly troublesome in a
context like foreign trade. As even Congress freely admits, the
ordinary legislative process has "several disadvantages" when it comes
to implementing free trade pacts:
Under ordinary rules, a bill may be amended in a
manner inconsistent with the underlying agreement,
which may require the President to re-open
negotiation of the agreement. Ordinary rules do not
require that a bill be voted on by a date certain, or
that it be voted on at all. A trade agreement could be
concluded and languish indefinitely.
These aspects of ordinary legislative procedure
pose difficulties for trade negotiations. A foreign
country may be reluctant to conclude negotiations
with the United States faced with uncertainty as to
whether and when a trade agreement will come up for
approval by Congress. Similarly, a country may be
reluctant to make concessions, knowing that it may
have to renegotiate following Congress's initial
consideration of the agreement.48
One can easily imagine how these possibilities could materialize.
A group of senators from the Midwest could threaten to filibuster an
implementing bill unless the president's negotiators extracted more
filibusters are now merely threats to filibuster, or "stealth filibusters," which makes them easier
to carry out. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 200-209.
47 McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57
LAW& CoNTEMp. PROBS. 3 (1994).
48 S. REP. No. 107-139, at 2 (2002).
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concessions on agricultural subsidies. A crucial committee chairman
in the House, who happens to hail from the Rust Belt, could demand
protectionist quotas on steel imports. 49 The desired adjustments
could upset a careful compromise that trade negotiators had labored
over for months. If the agreement were rejected altogether,
American trade negotiators would have squandered time and
strategic capital. And even if the agreement sailed through Congress
without incident, the mere possibility of congressional mischief or
inaction would surely influence the positions of foreign negotiators.
The recently re-enacted fast track procedures for trade pacts,
which originated in the Trade Act of 1974,50 carefully regulate the
consideration of implementing bills with an eye toward sweeping
away the obstacles associated with the familiar legislative process.
Under fast track, the majority leader of the House and the majority
leader of the Senate, or their designees, are to introduce the
president's implementing bill in their respective chambers on the
same day that the president submits it to Congress.-" The presiding
officer of each house should then refer the bill to the appropriate
committee(s).52 The procedures then require the committee to act
on an agreement within forty-five days,53  ensuring that the
administration's trade agreements avoid the silent death that befalls
many bills in committee. Once the bill reaches the floor, a vote on
final passage must be taken within fifteen days.54 Fast track is indeed
49 In considering the likelihood of such events occurring, it is worth noting that the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, widely viewed as contributing to the global Depression, was the
legislature's last serious attempt to regulate foreign commerce on its own. "Because
congressional logrolling and horsetrading contributed to every individual duty rate, Smoot-
Hawley set the most protectionist tariff levels in U.S. History.... [Its] most lasting legacy has
been a lingering public impression, fostered by the President, that near total congressional
control of international trade is synonymous with protectionism." Koh, supra note 23, at 1194.
50 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 151, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2191 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003)). Subsequent reauthorizations of
fast track have incorporated those procedures by reference to the 1974 Act. See, e.g., Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2103(b) (3) (A), 116 Stat. 933,
1006 (providing that the procedures of section 151 of the 1974 Act apply to qualifying
implementation bills).
51 19 U.S.C.A. § 2191(c)(1) (West Supp. 2003). If either chamber is not in session, the bill
will be introduced on the day they return. Id.
52 Id.




fast, at least compared to what can happen to controversial
legislation without it.55
Just as important as providing for expedited consideration, the
procedures also bar any attempt to amend the implementing bill.56
All types of legislation face the risk of debilitating amendment, of
course, but even minor amendments are extremely risky in this
context, since they could require trade representatives to renegotiate
the entire deal, often effectively scuttling the agreement.
Recognizing this possibility ahead of time, foreign governments
would be loath to sign on in the first place. Fast track's flat
prohibition on amendments is thus at the heart of its rationale. 57
In addition to prohibiting amendments and forcing speedy votes,
fast track regulates the actual process of floor consideration in quite
exquisite detail. In the House, fast track bars typical obstructionist
tactics by, among other things, (1) declaring that a motion to
proceed to consideration of the bill is highly privileged and not
debatable, (2) limiting debate on the implementing bill to twenty
hours, and (3) preventing debate on dilatory motions.58  The
procedures impose similar constraints on the Senate, 59 though here
they have even greater effect, for the limitation on debate prevents
filibusters. Under the normal Senate rules, in contrast, debate can
continue indefinitely unless sixty members vote to end it.6°
The methods that fast track uses to facilitate passage are not
unknown in legislative procedure. In fact, they parallel many of the
devices the political scientist Barbara Sinclair has identified as
elements of increasingly frequent "unorthodox lawmaking" in
Congress. 61  The rubric of unorthodox lawmaking embraces a
number of practices intended to ease passage of controversial
legislation, including the use of restrictive ("closed") rules of debate
in the House, "summits" at which key congressional and
administration figures hash out compromise bills, and leadership-
55 See, e.g., SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 98-99 (citing statistics on delays that beset
controversial legislation).
56 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (2000).
57 See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing fast track's rationale of
enhancing the credibility of U.S. trade negotiators).
58 19 U.S.C. § 2191(0 (2000).
59 See id. § 2191 (g).
60 Supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
61 See SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 1-8, 79-81, 83-108.
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engineered committee bypasses.62  A fast track regime brings
together a number of these elements. Fast track's limitations on
debate and amendment are equivalent to a closed rule issued by the
Rules Committee, for example, and its mandatory discharge
provision is a form of committee bypass.
The great difference between fast track and other forms of
unorthodox lawmaking is that fast track puts the facilitative devices
into statutory form. Laws like fast track can be seen as codifying
unorthodox lawmaking for particular classes of legislation. That the
rules are cast in statutory form is part of what makes fast track
valuable, but, as we will see next, it is also the source of potential
constitutional difficulties.
B. Statutized Rules and Noncommittal Commitment
Having looked at some of the details of how a fast track regime
operates, we can now turn to a more theoretical account of the
purpose of fast track regimes and statutized rules more generally. In
abstract terms, statutized rules can be understood as devices for
preventing Congress from engaging in certain types of procedural
opportunism. At the same time, however, Congress believes that the
Constitution limits its ability to constrain itself in matters of
procedure. As a result, statutized rules can only be described as a
curiously noncommittal form of commitment.
1. Fast Track and Commitment
The usual rationale for fast track is that it enhances the credibility
of American trade representatives. 63 Foreign nations would not
negotiate with us, the Bush administration urged, if they knew that
any agreement could be "picked apart by protectionist forces in
62 See id. at 77-79, 101-03 (summits), 93-95 (committee bypass), 95-98 (closed rules in the
House).
63 See H.R. REP. No. 107-249, pt. 1, at 17 (2001) ("[T]rade promotion authority gives U.S.
trading partners confidence that an agreement agreed to by the United States will not be
reopened during the implementing process."); S. REP. No. 107-139, at 2 (2002) (noting that
Congress's failure to implement Kennedy Round trade agreements damaged U.S. credibility
and led to the advent of fast track). The original fast track provisions in the Trade Act of 1974
also relied upon the credibility rationale. See S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 107 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7253; Trade Reform: Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1973) (remarks of Deputy Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations William R. Pearce) ("[O]ur trading partners are reluctant to negotiate with




Congress."64 Lending credence to that assertion, foreign officials
have often insisted that fast track is "essential" to meaningful trade
negotiations. 65 And, in fact, there does appear to be at least some
evidence to back up all of the claims of fast track's importance. As
the House Ways and Means Committee noted with concern, our
leading trading partners have been busy negotiating scores of free
trade agreements in the last decade, but the United States has not
reached any significant agreements since fast track expired.66 Fast
track seeks to build credibility by committing Congress to consider
an agreement as-is and without undue delay.
In addition to preventing Congress, or certain of its
vetogatekeepers, from scuttling trade pacts through delay or
amendment, fast track also guards against another sort of legislative
opportunism. The president, after all, is almost certain to sign a bill
that implements the treaty his administration negotiated, even if that
means acceding to extraneous provisions that he would otherwise
scorn.67 Knowing this, one could expect legislators to package an
administration's trade agreement with measures they desire, much
the same as happens with other "must-sign" bills. Indeed, this
dynamic was at work in the bill that re-authorized fast track, which
President Bush eagerly swallowed despite the bitter pill of a
Democrat-engineered increase in aid to laid-off workers. 68 Fast track
knocks down vetogates, each of which is an opportunity for the
64 Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Trade Authority; Bill Adds Billions for Workers Hurt by Foreign
Competition, WASH. POST, May 24, 2002, at Al.
65 Edmund L. Andrews, Why Isn't Fast Track... Faster?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at Cl
(quoting a senior advisor to the European Union's chief trade representative); see also Clyde H.
Farnsworth, President Backed on Canada Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1986, at DI ("Canadian
officials had said all along that they would back away from the negotiations without the
authority."); US. Return to Free Trade of Global Benefit THE AUSTRALIAN, July 30, 2002, at 10
("Trade Promotion Authority is crucial because most nations are unwilling to sign off on deals
if pork-barrelling protectionists in the U.S. Congress can then waltz in and demand
amendments.").
66 H.R. REP. No. 107-249, pt. 1, at 17.
67 This is of course only one example of the general problem of riders. See WILLIAM J.
KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PRoCESS 210 (6th ed. 1985).
Appropriations bills, as "must-pass" legislation, are most susceptible to such tactics. See, e.g.,
George Hager, House Passes Spending Bill; Massive Omnibus Measure Larded with Pet Projects, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 1998, at Al. Trade agreements would in most cases fall into the "must pass"
category from the president's point of view.
r8 Paul Blustein, Trade Bill to Help Laid-Off Workers; Victims of Imports Win Added Benefits,
WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at El. The assistance program appears as Title I of the omnibus
Trade Act.
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gatekeeper to add pet projects. Seen in its most favorable light, the
anti-rider aspect of fast track helps prevent pork-barreling and
arguably thereby amounts to a good-government measure in the
same vein as the Byrd Rule (which bars extraneous measures from
being tacked onto reconciliation resolutions) 69 or the line-item
veto. 70 So, while fast track is primarily intended to help the president
get the trade agreement he wants, it also means that he won't be
saddled with more than what he wants.
On both the credibility-enhancement and pork-abatement
rationales, the idea motivating fast track is an image of a Congress
unable to save itself from its own weakness. Congress thinks that
freer trade is generally in the nation's long-term best interests, yet it
also fears that tomorrow it (or its successors) will hear the siren song
of short-sighted protectionist or rent-seeking constituents. Like
Ulysses, Congress needs a commitment device, and fast track is that
device. 71 In this way, fast track is of a piece with proposals for a
balanced-budget constitutional amendment, 72 as well as with the
deficit-control measures at issue in Bowsher v. Synar.73 In all of these
cases, Congress seeks institutional devices that would compensate for
its anticipated lack of political willpower.
69 See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 128 (rev. ed. 2000)
(describing the Byrd Rule as a response to the fact that "[b]ecause there is a strong probability
that a reconciliation bill will pass once it is initiated, it is an attractive vehicle for provisions that
are unrelated to the budget.").
70 While the conventional view is that the line-item veto would simply reduce wasteful pork-
barrel spending, one should note that this view overlooks the fact that pork-distributing
measures are often necessary to grease open the hinges of vetogates and allow a bill to be
passed at all. A line-item veto could therefore significantly hinder Congress's ability to strike
deals, perhaps reducing the overall volume of legislative activity. See Maxwell L. Steams, The
Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 385, 412 (1992). Trade
agreements that could not gamer a majority in Congress might also benefit from that sort of
bundling. It is therefore at least conceivable that fast track could have the perverse effect of
making it harder to conclude a trade agreement, contrary to its main purpose.
71 The classic modern treatment of pre-commitment devices is JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984).
72 See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105,
1116-18 (1998) (discussing a balanced-budget amendment as a form of pre-commitment
device).
73 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The law at issue in Bowsher required the Comptroller General to
make automatic spending cuts whenever Congress exceeded a statutory deficit cap. Id. at 717-
18. See also Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13




Without going into the particular rationale for every regime of
statutized rules, a few examples suffice to show that they likely share
similar commitment dynamics. Congress knows, for instance, that
closing a military base will be bitter medicine for the legislators who
represent the base's district and state, even when there is a consensus
that some closures are required. Congress therefore created a
procedural system whereby it considers closure plans as an
unamendable whole, so that no individual legislator can exempt his
own local base when the time comes.74 Likewise, we can view statutes
regulating election contests75 as a means of mitigating the risks
created by each house's constitutional power to be the judge of its
members' qualifications and elections. 76 If procedures regarding
election contests were subject to the whim of the majority of the
chamber, members of the minority party would be at risk of a
partisan disposition of their disputes. The risk would be ameliorated
if the legislature could commit itself to following certain rules ahead
of time, before it is faced with a concrete dispute that would evoke
party biases. Thus the appeal of statutized rules, which allow a more
powerful commitment inasmuch as they can be changed only
through the joint will of both houses and the president.
2. The Disclaimer Clause
It is at this point that the commitment rationale runs into a
problem. Since the value of statutized rules presumably inheres, at
least in part, in their ability to commit the House and Senate to a
particular course of action, it comes as a bit of a surprise that the
code section setting forth the special fast track rules for trade
agreements includes a "disclaimer clause" reserving each chamber's
freedom to change its mind. According to the statute, the fast track
provisions are enacted:
74 See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2908, 104
Stat. 1485, 1816-18 (1990); Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 208, 102 Stat. 2623, 2623-33 (1988); see also Dalton v.
Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 481-82 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in part) (stating that Congress
recognized that base closure was "politically difficult" and so it devised a scheme that would
"bind its hands from untying a package").
75 See2 U.S.C. §§ 381-96 (2000).
76 See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 5, cl. 1. ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members. .. ").
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(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively,
and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of
each House, respectively ... and they supersede other
rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent
therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right
of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to
the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same
manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other
rule of that House.77
The disclaimer clause suggests that the special fast track
procedures, despite their presence in the U.S. Code, are no different
than any other rule of debate. Taken at face value, this clause
nullifies the effect of statutizing the special rules, rendering trade
agreements subject to committee bottle-ups, delaying tactics,
amendment battles, and so on-in short, all of the dilatory weapons
Congress supposedly wanted to commit itself not to use. Does
Congress simply hope that anxious trade partners will overlook this
provision?
Fast track's disclaimer clause is rather striking, given the statute's
avowed purposes, but the clause is neither novel nor uncommon.
Substantially identical language dates back at least to the
Reorganization Act of 1939, 78 which created special legislative
procedures for considering President Roosevelt's proposals to
restructure the executive branch. Congress usually, but not always,
inserts the same language in more recently enacted statutized rules. 79
77 Trade Act of 1974 § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000) (emphasis added). The 2002
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act incorporates the 1974 Act's fast track provisions by
reference. See Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2103(b) (3) (A), 116 Stat. 933, 1006 (2002) (referring to
Trade Act of 1974 § 151). The 2002 Act contains its own substantially identical disclaimer
clause that governs several new ancillary fast track procedures it creates. See id. § 2105(c).
78 Ch. 36, § 21, 53 Stat. 561, 564 (1939). The committee reports on the bill go no further
than paraphrasing the section. See H.R. REP. No. 76-120, at 7 (1939).
79 For examples of statutized rules that lack disclaimers, see Aviation Investment and
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 106(c), 114 Stat. 61 (2000) (codified in 49 U.S.C.A. § 48101
note (West Supp. 2002)); Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 628(c), 110 Stat. 3009 (1997); Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-52, § 632(c), 109 Stat. 468 (1996); Chief Financial Officers
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, § 303(b), 104 Star. 2838, 2850 (codified in 31 U.S.C. § 3515
note (2000)); Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-657,
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As a result, the bulk of our laws about lawmaking include provisions
that render their special statutory procedures no different, and no
more legally durable, than any other rule of proceeding.
How can we make sense of this noncommittal commitment? One
obvious possibility is that the Congress is just unwilling to commit
itself fully. Like someone struggling to quit smoking, it promises up
and down to abstain . . . unless it really needs a cigarette, in which
case all bets are off. That kind of weak-willed reluctance is likely part
of the answer, but it is not the whole story. If we take Congress at its
word, it appears to believe that a truly binding commitment to fast
track, no matter how desirable, is constitutionally impossible. The
Senate Finance Committee, commenting on disclaimer language
identical to that eventually enacted in the recent trade bill, remarked
as follows:
[The section permitting either house to change the
rules at any time] simply confirms what is the case under
Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that "(e)ach House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings... ." Because
the rules of proceedings in each House are
determined by that House and do not require the
consent of the other Chamber, each House may
change its rules independently of the will of the other
Chamber.8 0
The disclaimer clause, on this view, is simply a recognition of an
inalienable power of each house to set its own rules as it pleases.
That freedom, of course, is what a statutized rule is presumably
supposed to constrain, if it is to do its job. But Congress cannot
§ 5(a), 102 Stat. 3900 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 70113(e) (West 1997 & Supp.
2002)).
80 S. REP. No. 107-139, at 54 (2002) (emphasis added). The Conference Report, H.R.
CONE. REP. No. 107-624 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.CA.N. 649, does not mention this
aspect of the bill. A House Ways and Means Committee Report on a previous version of the bill
paraphrases the provisions at issue but offers no commentary. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-249, pt. 1,
at 43 (2001). Committee reports on other statutes with disclaimer clauses typically do not go
beyond merely paraphrasing the clause. When they say more, it is typically just to emphasize
that the clause restates a constitutional rule. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-2, at 15 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 38, 52 (noting, in connection with the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act's
disclaimer clause, that "[tihe Constitution already reserves the rulemaking powers of each
House" (emphasis added)).
2003] 365
Journal of Law & Politics
commit itself to fast track because the Constitution, as it were, forces
it to be free. This rather striking proposition in fact accords with the
history of Congress's behavior under statutized rules.
3. Congressional Practice Under Statutized Rules
If history is a reliable guide, the disclaimer clause is probably
unnecessary. The sentiment that the clause expresses-that
Congress may not impair its rules power by statute-finds
overwhelming support in past parliamentary practice. For while
statutes regulating internal procedures have a long history, so too
does Congress's belief that it may ignore them, even in the days
before the disclaimer clause. For instance, as the 36th Congress was
organizing itself in February 1860, Representative Whitely of
Delaware objected that it was out of order for the House to adopt
rules of proceedings before swearing in the clerk. The basis of his
point of order was a 1789 statute concerning the administration of
oaths at the beginning of new sessions.8' The law provided, among
other things, that the Speaker should administer the oath of office to
the other members and the clerk "previous to entering on any other
business."82 Notwithstanding the 1789 Act, the Speaker overruled
Whitely's point of order, relying on the House's history of adopting
rules before selecting a clerk.83
Other precedents from the same period demonstrate that the
issue was perceived to be of constitutional dimensions. In 1861, for
instance, the House Judiciary Committee considered a bill that would
have regulated the election of officers at the beginning of each
Congress. The Committee's report concluded that the bill would
violate the Rules of Proceedings Clause.8 4  The question of the
81 Act ofJune 1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23.
82 Id. § 2 (emphasis added). The modem version of this provision is codified at 2 U.S.C. §
25 (2000).
83 1 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 245 (1907) [hereinafter
HINDS' PRECEDENTS].
84 Id. § 82. At around the same time, the great parliamentarian Cushing noted that the
constitutionally troubling aspects of such statutes had also been a topic of debate in the state
legislatures:
The principle, that each branch of a legislative assembly has a right to
determine its own rules, is deemed so important that where it is inserted
into the constitution of a State, it has been doubted, whether it was
competent for the legislature of such State, by law, to provide rules for the
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permissibility of passing a law that would set the procedures for the
election of officers had evidently been a matter of contention for
some years.8 5
Bringing us nearer the precise problem presented by fast track, an
1855 bill establishing the Court of Claims provided a special
procedure by which the legislature would consider bills
appropriating funds to compensate victorious claimants. 86  In
particular, bills were to remain on the calendar from Congress to
Congress until finally acted upon. 87 In 1858, however, when a debate
arose over whether the current House was bound by that law, the
Speaker ruled that the bills would not continue on the calendar as
provided in the statute.88
There does appear to be a narrow exception to the general
practice of ignoring statutized rules. House precedents take the view
that the House is bound to follow procedures set forth in statutes to
which it assented earlier in the same session, despite its usual power
to change the rules by itself whenever it pleases. 89 The standard
disclaimer clause gives no indication of trying to avail itself of this
two-year commitment, however, for it provides that the statutized
procedures can be changed "at any time, in the same manner, and to
the same extent" as other rules.90 In any case, two years would rarely
be long enough to authorize, negotiate, conclude, and implement a
round of trade agreements. The 2002 fast track reauthorization in
government of its respective branches, which should bind them and
supercede their authority to make rules for themselves.
LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 614, at 247 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1989) (1856).
85 5 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 83, § 6765 (noting an 1841 debate that "brought up
again the point as to whether the inherent right of either House to elect its own officers might
be modified or limited by law").
86 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
87 Id. § 8, 10 Stat. at 614.
88 4 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 83, § 3298.
89 2 id. at § 1341; 5 id. at §§ 6767-68. These precedents concern whether the House could
deviate from statutory procedures for counting the 1877 electoral vote. The reporter notes that
"this law had been passed by this House, so the question as to the right of Congress to bind by
law a succeeding House in a matter relating to its procedure, did not arise." 5 id. § 6768, at 890
n.6.
90 E.g., 19 U.S.C. 2191 (a) (2).
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fact provides for fast track procedures until July 2005, with the built-
in opportunity for a further two-year extension.91
The Senate shares the House's suspicion of statutized rules. The
Reorganization Act of 194692 regulates committee jurisdiction and
membership along with procedural rules. The Senate's
parliamentary precedents nonetheless hold that the Senate may
change the Act's provisions relating to internal Senate affairs
through a simple (one-house) resolution, and, in fact, the Senate has
"amended" the Act in just that way.93  This despite the fact that
Congress has also amended the 1946 Act through legislation. 94
Legislators thus appear to enjoy a choice of two different methods to
amend such laws: one route through bicameralism and presentment,
the other through simple (i.e. one-chamber) resolution.
Of course, one should be careful not to overstate the clarity of the
historical precedents here. Presiding officers have sometimes felt
unsure of themselves when faced with conflicts between statutes and
the rules power, preferring to work around the difficulty rather than
face it head on.95 Congress has expressed concern over whether it
retains the ability to alter statutized rules as recently as 1983.96
Furthermore, the very fact that Congress has such a long history of
passing such statutes-statutes that especially in the early days did
not contain disclaimers-perhaps lends some degree of support to the
permissibility of setting rules by statute. This type of argument from
past practice is especially plausible considering that statutized
procedures date back to the very first Congress, which included
among its members a number of delegates to the Philadelphia
convention.97
91 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2103(c) (1), 116 Stat. 933, 1006-08 (2002).
92 60 Stat. 812 (1946). The Act contains a disclaimer clause, § 101, 60 Stat. at 814.
93 RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE [S. Doc 101-28] 1219-20 (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992); see S.
RES. 274, 96th Cong. (1979) (amending Senate rules regulated by 1946 Act).
94 See, e.g., Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140; An Act
to Amend the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 9, 63 Stat. 6 (1949).
95 In 1871, Speaker Blaine was unable to decide how to reconcile the House rules
regarding committee membership with a conflicting statute, and so he asked the whole House
to resolve the matter. The House decided to amend the rules to conform to the statute. See 5
HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 83, § 6766.
96 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-257, pt. 3, at 5 (1983). The Rules Committee therefore
recommended that disclaimer clauses be used to dispel any lingering doubts. Id.
97 Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926) (according "the greatest weight" to
the opinions of the first Congress concerning its views of the constitutionality of legislation
structuring the newly founded government).
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Nonetheless, whatever doubts might occasionally be entertained,
both chambers of Congress appear to have come quite firmly to
believe that the Constitution grants them the prerogative to abrogate
by unilateral action any statutory provision that concerns internal
affairs within the purview of the rules power. Their parliamentary
guides are confident on the matter, stating that it "has been settled
that Congress may not by law interfere with the constitutional right
of a future House to make is own rules."98  It is notable that the
disclaimer clauses that Congress now inserts in the large majority of
such statutes do not present themselves as creating an escape hatch
for a later Congress; on the contrary, these clauses merely
"recogni[zef" a chamber's "constitutional right" to change the rules.99
To the extent that committee reports discuss the issue at all, the
legislators contend that the clause "simply confirms what is the
case."
100
4. What's Left of the Rationale
Given the history and views discussed above, it is hardly surprising
that Congress has seized upon disclaimer clauses when political
exigencies make it desirable to abrogate a deal worked out in an
earlier fast track statute. In 1986, for example, while the House was
considering President Reagan's request for additional aid to the
Nicaraguan Contras, Representative Lott objected that the resolution
had not been introduced in the manner required by the statute
governing requests for aid. Speaker O'Neill, noting that the statute
recognized the House's power to change its rules at any time,
98 HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 388. While my primary concern is with federal practice,
one should note that conflicts between statutes and legislative rules also arise in the states,
where the authorities generally agree with Congress's view. See, e.g., Coggin v. Davey, 211
S.E.2d 708, 710-11 (Ga. 1975) (holding state "Sunshine Law" inapplicable to state legislature,
which had adopted rules contrary to it); Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Dwyer, 542
N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1996) (similar). These conflicts sometimes arise in the context of initiative
statutes submitted to the voters. See People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d
316 (1986) (invalidating portions of a ballot proposition that regulated the legislature's
internal procedures); Paisner v. Att'y Gen., 458 N.E.2d 734 (Mass. 1983) (holding that such a
measure exceeded the people's initiative power); James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of
Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491
(1986).
99 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2105(c) (2) (emphasis added).
100 S. REP. NO. 107-139, at 54 (2002); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-257, pt. 3, at 5 (1983)
(noting the view of some committees that the disclaimer clause is unnecessary because the
power to change statutized rules derives from the Constitution).
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decided that debate would be governed by the rule reported by the
Rules Committee, not by the special procedures the statute
provided. 10 1 Congress has relied on the disclaimer clause to escape
inconvenient statutized rules in other instances as well, and the
courts have been unwilling to intervene.10 2 Perceptive commentators
are therefore keenly aware of fast track's legal limitations. 10 3
Congress's asserted constitutional right to change the rules in
disregard of statutory directives-not to mention its history of having
done so when it really wants to-plainly does not bolster fast track's
credibility rationale. All the same, it does not render the statute
wholly nugatory; it does have some, albeit more modest, effect. For
one thing, even if Congress is free to evade fast track rules, the
existence of such rules might still have substantial force as a de facto
commitment device in many cases. The statutized rule in effect
establishes default rules for the consideration of trade agreements;
opponents then have the burden of overcoming the inertia behind
the statutized procedures. And as we will see later, the procedural
status quo can be a powerful force, at least in the Senate. 10 4
The fast track statute also has an important political dimension. A
vote to kill the fast track procedures would be far more publicly
understandable than are the myriad obscure procedural
machinations that can derail legislation in the ordinary legislative
process. Thus, even if fast track rules can be changed like any other
101 For descriptions, see Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALEJ.
INT'L L. 69, 99 n.141 (1988); and Edmund Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade
Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L LJ. 471, 507-10 (1990).
102 In 1981, for example, the House deviated from the Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation
Act's rule, 15 U.S.C. § 719f(d)(5)(B), that no resolution approving a presidential
recommendation to waive regulatory requirements could be considered within sixty days of
another resolution concerning the same presidential recommendation. In debate,
Representative Long referred to the disclaimer clause to justify circumventing the rule. See
Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1284-86 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(describing the incident). In the subsequent suit challenging the propriety of the House's
consideration of the waiver resolution, the D.C. Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because
the case presented a political question. Id. at 1286-88. On the justiciability of legislative rules
of procedure more generally, see Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative
Rules and the "Political" Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1990); and Gregory
Frederick Van Tatenhove, Comment, A Question of PowerJudicial Review of Congressional Rules of
Procedure, 76 KY. L.J. 597 (1987).
103 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 143, 151 (1992) (noting "the oft-overlooked fact that, as a legal matter, the Fast Track
'emperor' has no clothes: the statutory Fast Track procedures that modify internal house rules
in no way legally 'bind' Congress").
104 See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
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rule, a vote on a resolution to do so would be a politically salient
event, especially since it would likely mean the rejection of the
president's trade agreement. 10 5 Accordingly, even while noting its
right to ignore fast track, Congress also points out its past good
behavior in refraining from exercising its purported constitutional
powers: "Historically, when fast track legislation has been in place
for trade agreements, neither House has ever acted unilaterally to
withdraw application of fast track procedures."'0 6 In other words:
Trust us, we've never let you down before. Having made such a
promise, breaking it could have significant reputational effects. Of
course, as we have just seen, Congress has in fact sometimes taken
advantage of disclaimer clauses in other contexts. It is hard to
believe that Congress would keep this promise if legislators and their
constituents strongly disfavored a trade agreement; but, as history
seems to suggest, fast track at least affects a loose de facto
commitment.
Enacting a fast track statute is not wholly pointless, and a
president who lobbies for it is not irrational; at the margin, the
presence of the statutized rules increases the probability of
successfully implementing a free trade pact. And yet fast track is not
nearly the powerful tool that one who is unaware of the disclaimer
clause (and congressional practice) might suppose. The reason why
the scheme is hobbled, if we are to believe Congress, is that the
Constitution forbids the legislature from enacting a truly binding
statutized rule. A good deal thus hangs on that constitutional claim.
The rest of this paper explores whether Congress's view is correct
and, if so, why. What is wrong with Congress choosing to use its
legislative powers to create a regime of statutized rules?
For purposes of the argument in the next Part of the paper, it is
important to note the language with which Congress has typically
expressed the problem with statutized rules. The precedents couch
the issue in terms of one house "binding" its successors. 10 7
Commentators who have discussed such rules use the same
105 Cf Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 KANS. L REV. 1113, 1163-68, 1173-74 (1997) (arguing that the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act's procedural requirements can have a significant political
effect even though they are legally waivable).
106 S. REP. No. 107-139, at 54 (2002).
107 See, e.g., 4 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 83, § 3298; 5 id. § 6768, at 890 n.6.
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entrenchment-tinged idiom.108 The perceived problem with such
laws is that they amount to a cross-temporal power-grab, one
Congress attempting to entrench its preferences against another.
If binding one's successors is the problem with fast track, then
there should not be any problem with the legislature being bound by
a statutized rule passed during the same session. Parliamentary
precedents, in fact, suggest exactly that view, holding that the House
is bound to follow procedures set forth in statutes to which it
assented earlier in the same session, despite its usual unilateral power
over its rulesY°9 Thus, one can see the outlines of a coherent critique
of fast track that would be rooted in a norm of anti-entrenchment.
The next Part scrutinizes fast track through the lens of
entrenchment. As we will see, however, the entrenchment-based
critique of fast track runs into a number of puzzles.
II. THE ENTRENCHMENT CRITIQUE
When one looks at fast track from a suitable distance, what one
sees is a Congress that wants to commit itself (if perhaps reluctantly)
to a future course of conduct that it knows might be unpalatable
when the time for action comes. In this way, fast track is similar to
measures such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit control law,
and, even more broadly, constitution-making. And if Ulyssean
commitment is the point of fast track, then the natural source of
criticism is the anti-entrenchment norm, which, as elaborated upon
below, forbids one legislature from binding its successors. As we saw
earlier, Congress's own self-understandings also impel one toward an
entrenchment-focused critique, for its precedents use the anti-
entrenchment idiom and track its results. The implication of the
anti-entrenchment norm, it would appear, is that Congress cannot
bind itself to follow statutized rules despite the tremendous benefits
that commitment might bring. Thus we are left with the unavoidable
108 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 73, at 225-27; Vasan Kasavan, Is the Electoral Count Act
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L REv. 1653, 1779-81 (2002). An exception is Adrian Vermeule, who
suggests that the separation of powers may provide more fertile grounds for objection. See
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure 52 (University of Chicago
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 39, Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html.
109 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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result recognized by the disclaimer clause: fast track rules can be
changed like any other rule.
This Part begins by briefly canvassing the types of entrenchment
that fast track might possibly implicate. I then argue, contrary to the
conventional view, that fast track is not entrenching, or, at any rate,
not impermissibly entrenching.
A. Categorizing Entrenchment
Professors Posner and Vermeule, in a recent essay on the subject,
define entrenchment as "the enactment of either statutes or internal
legislative rules that are binding against subsequent legislative action
in the same form."110 The word "binding" is used here in a narrow
legal sense, for while some laws might be irrepealable as a matter of
political reality-the core social security statutes come to mind, for
instance-the more constitutionally interesting form of
entrenchment is de jure entrenchment. Social security, therefore, is
not (legally) entrenching, as it does not contain legal provisions that
block its amendment or repeal. A statute that purported to establish
permanent and unamendable tax rates, on the other hand, would be
entrenching, since such a law would seek to prevent future
legislatures from altering its directives.
Entrenchments can be categorized along at least two dimensions.
Along the first dimension, one can classify them according to the
magnitude of the attempt to entrench. A directive could purport to
forbid its repeal or amendment altogether, for example, or it might
merely condition amendment upon burdensome procedures, such as
a supermajority vote or the votes of two successive sessions; similarly,
the entrenching effect might claim to be permanent, or, in a weaker
entrenchment, the directive might claim to be irrepealable only for a
particular length of time.11' Along the second dimension, one can
divide entrenchments based upon the type of directive being
entrenched, such as statutes ("legislative entrenchment"),
parliamentary rules ("rules entrenchment"), and so on.
1 10 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J.
1665, 1667 (2002).
111 Cf Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Reactivity, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 379, 384-85 (1987) (distinguishing modes of
entrenchment along similar lines and providing examples).
2003]
Journal of Law & Politics
In our system, entrenched legislation is a rare creature, for it is
almost universally regarded as impermissible. 12 In probably the
leading Supreme Court case on the topic, Newton v. Commissioners,l13
the Court was confronted with a state statute that purported to
"permanently establish[]" a certain town as the county seat of
Mahoning County, Ohio. The Court could not countenance such a
result, for each session of the legislature is equally dignified,
regardless of its temporal position:
Every succeeding legislature possesses the same
jurisdiction and power with respect to [public
interests] as its predecessors. The latter have the same
power of repeal and modification which the former
had of enactment, neither more nor less. All occupy,
in this respect, a footing of perfect equality. This must
necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to
the public welfare that each one should be able at all
times to do whatever the varying circumstances and
present exigencies touching the subject involved may
require. A different result would be fraught with
evil. 114
The opinion leaves the constitutional source of the anti-
entrenchment norm uncertain, as do the few other cases that have
touched on the issue." 5 The Court treats it as quite obvious that one
112 But see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 110 (questioning the dominant view).
113 100 U.S. 548 (1879).
114 Id. at 559.
115 See, e.g., Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932); Manigault v. Springs, 199
U.S. 473, 487 (1905); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 621 (1899). The
leading academic defense of the anti-entrenchment rule is Julian Eule, supra note 111. Eule
locates the prohibition in "the spirit" of the clauses of the Constitution that provide for
elections every two years for Representatives and every six years for Senators, which show that
the people endow their representatives with a limited temporal mandate. I& at 405; see also
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and
Normative Theory, 89 VA. L REV. 385 (2003) (providing an originalist defense of the anti-
entrenchment rule). For a (skeptical) discussion of possible justifications for the anti-
entrenchment rule, see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 110, at 1673-93.
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legislature cannot impose its will on its successors, sometimes stating
the proposition without citing any authority at all. 116
If one wishes to make an enactment resistant to subsequent
legislative action, then one can pass it as a constitutional
amendment. A chief virtue of constitutions is that they lay down
basic ground rules that cannot be changed through ordinary politics
and run-of-the-mill legislation. Thus, the very idea of
constitutionalism is, in a broad sense, an exercise in pre-
commitment, a close cousin of entrenchment." 7 Yet a constitution is
not itself truly entrenching unless it purports to be binding against
future action in the same form. The U.S. Constitution, in contrast,
explicitly provides procedures for its own amendment in Article V-
with a few key exceptions: Certain provisions relating to slavery
could not be changed at all until 1808, and no amendment can
deprive a state of equal representation in the Senate without its
consent.118 Thus the Constitution's directives are insulated vis-a-vis
ordinary lawmaking, but they are not, by and large, really
entrenched. One can also speak of internal parliamentary rules
being entrenched, though, as with legislative entrenchment, actual
examples are thin on the ground. In 1995, the newly Republican
House of Representatives, as part of its "Contract with America,"
established a rule requiring a sixty-percent majority in order to pass
any bill that raises taxes." 9 This rule is perhaps unwise, and, at least
in the estimation of several prominent commentators, it is
unconstitutional because of its anti-majoritarian voting
requirement. 120 Whether it is an example of an entrenching rule
depends upon whether repeal of the rule by a subsequent Congress
could be effected in the same way the rule was passed: by a mere
majority. The ability to repeal the supermajority requirement by a
116 See, e.g., Manigault, 199 U.S. at 487; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the
Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972) (calling the rule "so obvious
as rarely to be stated").
117 On constitutions as pre-commitment devices, see, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND
CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 135 (1995).
118 U.S. CONST. art. V.
119 See H.R. Res. 6, § 106(a), 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted). The current version is
codified as Rule XXI(5)(b).
120 Bruce Ackerman et al., Comment: An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE LJ.
1539 (1995);Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996).
But seeJohn 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) (arguing that the rule is constitutional).
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mere majority would obviously erode most of the rule's legal (though
not necessarily political) importance. Nonetheless, the
overwhelming suspicion that surrounds entrenchment leads even the
most persistent academic supporters of the Republicans' rule to
concede that a majority vote suffices to repeal it. 121 The House's
parliamentary practices confirm that a special rule from the Rules
Committee, adopted by a majority, trumps the supermajoritarian
requirement.122 So this rule does not entrench itself, but it at least
shows us what rules entrenchment would look like. This is important
since, as discussed below, fast track could be accused of effecting a
rules entrenchment.
B. How Fast Track Does Not Impermissibly Entrench
How does fast track fit into the entrenchment picture? Statutized
rules certainly have an air of entrenchment about them, and, as
noted above, the anti-entrenchment idiom is the conventional way of
explaining why later legislatures may permissibly ignore them. Why
else put procedures into statutes, one would think, if not to try to
bind future Congresses to follow those procedures? By enacting a
law regulating internal procedures, one session of Congress tries to
force its successors to follow certain rules of debate. And that is
precisely what the anti-entrenchment norm says is forbidden.
Natural as that line of reasoning would appear, I do not believe it
succeeds in showing that a binding fast track regime is impermissible.
To begin with, fast track statutes are not, strictly speaking, really
entrenching at all, even when they lack any sort of escape clause.
The hallmark of entrenchment is the enactment of a directive that
can be changed only by a process more burdensome than that which
created it. Yet the statute setting forth the special fast track
procedures does not purport to be irrepealable by a future statute. It
can be amended or repealed just like any other. It is therefore not,
in the language of the Posner/Vermeule definition, 123 an enactment
that is "binding against subsequent legislative action in the same
form." The statute is durable as against a different (and presumably
121 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 120, at 500-507.
122 HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 1067; see also Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (listing several occasions on which the rule has been abrogated by House
majorities).
123 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 110, at 1667.
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less weighty) form of enactment-in this case, internal resolutions of
one chamber-but the fast track statute does not condition its own
amendment upon a procedure more arduous than that which
produced it. Whatever other issues might be lurking, the general
proposition that a statute cannot be amended by a resolution of one
house should not be problematic from the point of view of
entrenchment. On the contrary, the proposition seems, if anything,
compelled by Chadha.124
It is true, of course, that enacting a (statutorily amendable) fast
track law has some impact on how subsequent legislatures conduct
their affairs-that's presumably part of the point. The statute
establishes expedited procedures as the default rules of debate. A
later Congress must act affirmatively to change those rules. But this
burden on later legislators does not offend the Constitution, for all
legislation-or rather, all legislation that lacks a sunset clause-has
this kind of de facto entrenching effect of establishing a new status
quo.
If fast track can properly be said to implicate any kind of
entrenchment, it could only be rules entrenchment, not the more
familiar legislative entrenchment. We could think of fast track as an
otherwise ordinary procedural rule that had the peculiar feature of
being amendable only if both houses jump through the hoops of
Article I, Section 7; to the extent that its peculiar mode of
amendment makes the rule harder to change, it could be considered
a mild form of rules entrenchment. As the discussion of the
Contract with America tax rule showed, there is a strong suspicion of
procedural rules that appear to entrench themselves against later
repeal or amendment. Nonetheless, on a closer look, the case
against rules entrenchment is in fact not nearly so strong as the case
against legislative entrenchment, either in terms of parliamentary
practice or in terms of constitutional logic.
Let us begin with parliamentary practice, where the situation
differs importantly between the two chambers. Reflecting its general
view that current majorities should work their will in matters of
procedure, the House of Representatives adopts its rules by majority
vote at the beginning of each session. 125 Once adopted, the rules are
124 See infra notes 170-180 and accompanying text (examining Chadha's relevance).
125 WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND
PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 807-08 (1996). Before adopting rules at the beginning of a new
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subject to amendment or repeal during the session in generally the
same way as the House deals with any other matter. 126 (Of course,
the House would ordinarily not go so far as to amend the standing
rules; the procedures governing any particular piece of legislation
can be changed by a special rule from the Rules Committee.) In
contrast, under Senate Rule V, the rules of the Senate continue in
effect from one session to the next unless they are changed "as
provided in these rules. ' 127 Turning to Rule XXII, one finds that ending
debate on a motion to change the rules requires the agreement of
two-thirds of those present and voting.128 The combined effect of
these two rules, therefore, is that the rules of the Senate, including
the filibuster-enabling supermajority cloture rule itself, persist from
session to session unless a supermajority can be found to change
them. 129 As one of the leading authorities on entrenchment puts it,
"No better illustration of entrenchment could be offered."130
session, the House operates under the general parliamentary law described in Jefferson's
Manual, which incorporates the principle of majority rule. See HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 9, §§
60, 508. The House takes the view that one session may not attempt to extend its rules into a
subsequent session against the latter's will. Id. §§ 59, 388; 5 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 83,
§§ 6743-47.
126 The Rules Committee has jurisdiction to report resolutions amending the standing
rules, which resolutions would require only a majority to pass. If the committee failed to report
a resolution, a majority of the whole House (not of the quorum) could discharge it from the
committee. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 120, at 500-03 (describing routes by which
the rules can be changed).
12 7 SEN R. V (emphasis added).
128 The cloture rule for ending debate on a motion to change the rules thus differs from
the usual cloture rule for substantive legislation, which requires the vote of three-fifths of those
duly chosen and sworn. See SEN R. XXII.
129 The prospects of such a change occurring are very small. The party that finds itself in
the minority in a particular session will have a strong incentive to maintain the status quo, for
the filibuster is the minority's main weapon. Accordingly, we can expect the minority party to
filibuster any motion to amend Rule XXII's supermajority cloture rule. The majority party
could defeat such a filibuster only in the unlikely event that it could win the votes of two-thirds
of those present and voting, but a majority with that degree of dominance would have relatively
little need to change the rules, for it could easily defeat any filibuster throughout the session.
130 See Eule, supra note 111, at 410; see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 246 ("The
Senate that adopted Rule XXII bound all Senates in the future and made change of the
Senate's Rules extremely difficult."); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 110, at 1694 (calling the
Senate's cloture practices "[a] classic entrenchment"). There is a slight complication in that
the supermajoritarian cloture rule, first adopted in 1917 and amended several times since then,
was in fact a reform intended to make it easier to close debate than had previously been
possible. See Eule, supra note 111, at 407 & nn.129-30; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at
195-99. At no point did a bygone majoritarian Senate simply decide that henceforth cloture
would require a supermajority. Therefore, Fisk and Chemerinsky are not quite on target when
they speak of "the Senate that adopted Rule XXII" binding its successors to a supermajoritarian
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In the view of Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky, who have
undertaken a careful study of the filibuster's constitutionality, and of
Professor Eule, an authority on entrenchment, the Senate's current
regime of filibuster-preserving filibusters ought to be unconstitutional
precisely on entrenchment grounds. 31  This anti-entrenchment
argument received a significant airing in the Senate a few decades
ago. 132 It was also a theme during recent discussions criticizing the
Senate's judicial confirmation process. 133 But when squarely faced
with votes on the question in 1967, 1969, and 1975, Senate majorities
upheld the principle that a simple majority cannot invoke cloture on
a motion to change the rules. 3 4 As things actually stand, therefore,
the legality of rules entrenchment appears, in the Senate, quite well-
settled.
Rules entrenchment is quite attractive in some ways. While
legislative entrenchment of substantive policies-such as a
permanent statutory ban on new taxes or spending-could soon
prove disastrous, I would suggest that entrenchment is not
necessarily so troubling an idea when it comes to a chamber's
internal rules and procedures. For while it would often be extremely
unwise for one legislature to set policy for all eternity, much of the
justification for having a constitution-a justification that a
constitutionally based anti-entrenchment norm cannot reject-is
based on the value of locking in a few fundamental ground rules.
The point of a constitution is that its directives are resistant to the
whims of transitory bare majorities who would seek to reconfigure
the government to suit their aims. A chamber's rules of proceedings
rules regime. So although the filibuster is plainly anti-majoritarian (so too the Senate, of
course), it provides only an impure example of entrenchment.
131 Eule, supra note 111, at 411; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 247-52.
132 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 210-11. For a more comprehensive history of
efforts to change the Senate rules regarding cloture, see BINDER & SMITH, supra note 42, at 161-
85.
133 See, e.g., Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is Denied Its
Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
134 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 42, at 176-82; Eule, supra note 111, at 410-11; Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 212-13. Regarding the 1975 vote, Binder and Smith suggest that
a majority actually favored simple majority cloture for changing the rules but that the
reformers surrendered that position in order to win reform of the cloture rules regarding
business other than changes in the rules. BINDER & SMITH, supra note 42, at 181-82. Whatever
the motivations, the outcome was that a majority of the Senate voted against allowing a simple
majority to end debate on changing the rules.
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are, in a real sense, its very own constitution, and the same
considerations typically adduced with regard to the value of
constitutional ground rules suggest as well the value of entrenching
some internal procedures. (Indeed, doesn't the fact that the
chambers keep voluminous records of internal procedural
precedents suggest that they do not view their rules as solely the
creatures of current majorities?)
While the Rules of Proceedings Clause grants a vast authority over
parliamentary structure and procedure, the Constitution itself
establishes a number of parliamentary basics ranging over topics
from quorum rules to expulsion of members. 3 5 This is a perfectly
understandable thing for sophisticated framers to do. With regard to
the expulsion power, for example, Madison feared that factional
passions might lead to abuses, and so the Convention
constitutionalized a supermajority rule. 136 The Constitution has not
provided means of protecting against all of the potential abuses,
however. One would not want one session's bare majority to change
the rules so as to eliminate the minority's committee positions, for
instance, but the Constitution does not explicitly forbid such an
event. 3 7 Where the Constitution has not provided a safeguard, a
statute regulating internal procedures could be valuable as a second-
best defense, inasmuch as the abuse would have to be ratified by the
other chamber and the executive. 138
The point of the foregoing is simply to point out that rules
entrenchment finds some support in legislative practice and,
moreover, finds support in the same political logic that undergirds
constitutionalism. These considerations tend to diminish the force
of the anti-entrenchment attack on a binding fast track regime, and I
find them quite compelling. Nonetheless, even if one insists that
135 See Vermeule, supra note 108.
136 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (Max Farrand ed. 1966)
[hereinafter RECORDS] (Aug. 10, 1787).
137 A much less egregious attempt to diminish the minority party's committee influence
was at issue in VanderJagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Republicans charged that
Democrats gave them fewer committee seats than the number to which they were
proportionately entitled. While Republicans were 44.14% of the House, they received only
40% of the seats on the Budget Committee and the Appropriations Committee, 34.29% of the
seats on the Ways and Means Committee, and 31.25% of the seats on the Rules Committee. Id.
at 1166. The court refused to adjudicate the dispute. Id. at 1176-77.
138 As noted earlier, there are statutes regulating committee structures, but these have
been "amended" outside of the statutory process. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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rules entrenchment is strictly constitutionally prohibited, one can
still resist the conclusion that the disclaimer clause is the mandated
response. For, as it turns out, the putative escape hatch recognized
by the disclaimer clause would likely fail to prevent entrenchment.
Indeed, it might lead to rules that are no less entrenched than they
would be under a legally binding (but statutorily amendable) fast
track regime.
That last claim probably sounds counterintuitive, given that the
disclaimer clause is supposed to reaffirm the constitutional freedom
of each chamber to act, unilaterally, as it pleases. The disclaimer,
recall, provides that each body may change fast track rules "at any
time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule
of that House." In the Senate, however, to change the rules "in the
same manner" as any other rule of the Senate just means to follow
Rules V and XXII. As discussed above, 139 these rules together have
the effect of requiring the assent of two-thirds of those present and
voting in order to end debate on a motion to change the rules
(versus the assent of three-fifths of those duly sworn required to end
debate on substantive legislation). This is a serious burden, as
attempts to end the super-majoritarian cloture rule suggest.140
Indeed, it is very possibly more difficult to change the Senate rules
via the Senate's normal internal process than it is to change them by
the relatively more majoritarian statutory route that produced fast
track in the first place.' 4' If so, then the route recognized in the
disclaimer clause does not permit rules to be changed by a less
onerous procedure than that which produced them. So which
regime of statutized rules would be guilty of entrenchment: a "non-
binding" version that contemplates action through the Senate's rules
process, or a "binding" version that permits amendment only via
Article I, Section 7?
139 See supra text accompanying note 129.
140 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 209-13 (recounting attempts to liberalize the
cloture rule).
141 A roughly parallel situation is the choice between treating an international agreement
as a treaty-which requires two-thirds of the Senate-versus treating it as a congressional-
executive agreement-which is implemented through the ordinary legislative process. The
latter is generally thought to be the easier route. See infra note 218. Of course, the president
would likely want to veto any bill that changed his fast track authority, in which case taking the
route of ordinary legislation would require two-thirds of both houses. Yet, as discussed above,
see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text, Congress can package legislation so as to frustrate
the president's veto ambitions.
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These are just more puzzles, not answers. But what the puzzles
suggest is that norms of anti-entrenchment cannot yield a coherent
explanation of what, if anything, is wrong with setting rules by
statute. Fast track can implicate only rules entrenchment, not
legislative entrenchment. But, as we have just seen, it is not so clear
that our practices actually condemn rules entrenchment, and it is
disputable whether rules entrenchment really should trouble us in
the same way as its statutory cousin. Finally, if one does not like hard-
to-change rules, it does not seem that fast track scores worse in that
regard than does the alternative, at least in the Senate.
All the same, even after hearing the arguments adduced above,
statutized rules like fast track still seem to have some air of
entrenchment about them. It is true that the statutized rule can be
amended or repealed like any other statute. Later legislatures are
unimpaired in that regard. But the enactment of a binding
statutized rule would nonetheless do something that looks
suspiciously like entrenchment because it appears to diminish the
stature of later legislatures. What it would do is change the domain
in which Congress sets (some of) its rules of debate: Control over
the affected rules would move from the domain of single-chamber
procedural resolutions to the domain of statutes. This is an
important change. The position of a later Congress is indeed
different from that of its predecessors in this regard. But what kind
of a change is this? Congress and commentators couch the issue in
terms of the impermissibility of one Congress binding a subsequent
Congress, but that is not the real problem with such a shift in the
means of governing debate. The problem here is not the balance of
power between this Congress and a later one but rather the balance
of power between Congress and the president-that is, the
separation of powers. Statutizing the rules invites the president into
an area that, as a matter of constitutional law, he has no business
being. The next Part of the paper aims to show that considerations
associated with the separation of powers give us a more satisfying view
of what seems troubling about statutized rules.
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III. THE RULES OF PROCEEDINGS CLAUSE AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
Contemporary commentary on separation of powers has largely
come to focus on the Constitution's Vesting Clauses. 142 When one
looks at a potential separation of powers problem through the lenses
of these clauses, the important questions inevitably become questions
about function. 143 First we ask which one of the Constitution's three
functionally identified powers-legislative, executive, or judicial-
describes a certain activity. With that answer in hand, we ask whether
the correct branch-Congress, the president, or the courts-is
performing the function. If there is a mismatch between the branch
and the activity, there is a violation.
Such an approach would surprise the Framers. For Madison,
experience with the state governments under the Articles of
Confederation had shown him that constitutional clauses that tried
to separate powers-"parchment barriers," as he called them in
Federalist No. 48-were ineffective in preventing dangerous
agglomerations of power.144 He therefore asks us to move beyond
such definitional exercises: "After discriminating, therefore, in theory,
the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative,
executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide
some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others."'145
What would provide that practical security? After dismissing several
options, Madison finally comes to describe the foundation for the
separation of powers in Federalist No. 51. In what makes for a surprise
for many modern readers, he there focuses on parts of the
constitutional framework that seem like mere technicalities:
appointments, tenure in office, and salaries. As Professor Nourse has
helped us recognize, those attributes of office, together with
142 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.");
id. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."); id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
143 See Nourse, supra note 19 (explaining how over-emphasis on the Vesting Clauses leads
to a function-matching approach to the separation of powers).
144 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 276 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
145 Id. (emphasis added).
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officeholders' electoral incentives, were at the heart of the Framers'
understanding of the separation of powers. 146
What Madison's thinking should suggest to us is that the
separation of powers is rooted in many parts of the Constitution, not
solely, or even primarily, in the Vesting Clauses. One of the
overlooked sources, I suggest, is the text providing that "[e]ach
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings."' 47 Just as other
scholars have shown the crucial role in the separation of powers
played by seemingly prosaic bits of text such as the Incompatibility
Clause,148 the following pages provide an account of the foundational
role played by the Rules of Proceedings Clause. The account should,
I hope, be worthwhile in its own right inasmuch as it casts light on an
underappreciated part of the constitutional design. In addition, the
account will show why neither fast track nor any other statutized rule
can be binding, and it will do so in a more satisfying fashion than can
the anti-entrenchment norm.
Section A begins with the text of the Rules of Proceedings Clause
and asks whether it directly forbids a fast track regime. Finding that
inquiry inconclusive, the remainder of the Article then develops the
clause's role in the separation of powers, beginning in Section B by
drawing upon political science scholarship concerning agenda-
setting. Section C then links the findings regarding agenda-setting to
a constitutional principle that requires each branch to be sovereign
over its own internal affairs. A binding fast track regime, I conclude,
would violate that principle.
A. The Rules of Proceedings Clause Unadorned
Separation of powers analysis is always thorny. Faced with the
seemingly irreconcilable approaches and outcomes that characterize
the cases, respected commentators have found this branch of
constitutional jurisprudence no less than appalling. 149 Our inquiry
here at least has the advantage of being anchored by a concrete piece
of text, and so it is worth considering whether fast track violates the
Rules of Proceedings Clause more straightforwardly, without the
146 See Nourse, supra note 19.
147 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
148 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 20.
149 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysma, 57
CEO. WASH. L. REv. 506 (1989); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1025 (2d ed. 1998).
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more amorphous separation of powers considerations that emanate
from it. This type of clause-tethered approach did, after all, find
favor with the Supreme Court in the line-item veto case, where the
majority eschewed an explicit separation of powers analysis and
instead decided the case on the "narrow," more text-focused grounds
of Article I, Section 7.150
The Rules of Proceedings Clause simply declares that "[e]ach
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings."' 5 1 Under a
binding fast track regime, a chamber could change the relevant rules
only by joining together with the other house, plus the president,
and amending the statute. Under such a regime, a house would be
unable to set its own rules. Such a system would directly conflict with
the constitutional directive that each house may determine its own
Rules. Thus, fast track violates the Constitution. Or so a simple
textual argument might run.
The usual interpretive guides provide scant guidance on whether
the syllogistic textual argument captures the proper import of the
Rules of Proceedings Clause. The Framers certainly did not trouble
over the rules power. During the 1787 convention, the Committee of
Detail included the clause as part of Article VI, Section 6 of their
draft, which provided that "[e] ach House may determine the rules of
its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly behaviour;
and may expel a member."' 52 When the full convention took up
consideration of this section, Madison suggested that the text be
amended to require a two-thirds vote for expulsion. 153  The
amendment succeeded, and then the section as a whole was
approved, apparently without further debate or controversy.154
That the clause should strike the Framers as uncontroversial is, of
course, not particularly surprising. A legislative assembly could
hardly function without rules, and it seems only natural that the body
itself should choose them. As Justice Story wrote:
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision
authorizing each house to determine the rules of its
15 0 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
152 2 REcoRDs, supra note 136, at 180 (Aug. 6, 1787).
153 2 id. at 254 (Aug. 10, 1787).
15 4 See id.
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own proceedings. If the power did not exist, it would
be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the
nation, either at all, or at least with decency,
deliberation, and order. The humblest assembly of
men is understood to possess this power; and it would
be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation of a
like authority.155
Indeed, for some members of the Founding Generation, the
legislature's power over its rules was merely a specific instance of a
general right of self-government derived from natural law. 156
Nor has the Supreme Court had much occasion to confront the
clause. The leading modern case on rules of proceedings is Yellin v.
United States, 157 in which the Court reversed a contempt of Congress
conviction on the grounds that the House Committee on Un-
American Activities had failed to follow its own rules while
questioning the petitioner. The other leading pronouncement, now
over one hundred years old, gives the Rules of Proceedings Clause a
broad but sensible reading, holding that each house may choose
whatever rules it likes, provided only that its rules do not conflict with
the Constitution or violate individuals' fundamental rights.158 A few
other appellate cases have dealt with rules of proceedings issues, 159
but none of the decisions give us insight into the substance of the
rules power as it bears on the problem at hand-namely, whether the
clause permits Congress to set internal rules by statute.
In interpreting the Rules of Proceedings Clause, we must recall
the background norm that congressional action typically requires
bicameral approval and presentment to the president. The Rules of
Proceedings Clause, however, is one of several "carefully defined
155 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 835
(1833).
156 See 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 195 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
157 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
158 United States v. Bailin, 144 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1892).
159 For a summary of the few cases that have interpreted the rules of proceedings power,
see John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of
Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 530-41 (2001). Roberts's
conclusion is that the cases "show both doctrinal confusion and an understandable reluctance
to judge the internal rules of the House and Senate." Id. at 530. See also supra note 102 and
accompanying text (discussing the justiciability of disputes involving parliamentary rules).
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exceptions" to this usual requirement. 16° In derogation from the
norm of bicameralism and presentment, it provides that "[e]ach House
may determine" its own rules. It thus empowers each house
unilaterally to set its own procedures, which may well differ from
those of the other chamber. 161 At the same time, the clause does not
on its face expressly require that rules may be set only in that manner.
In this way the Rules of Proceedings Clause differs from some other
exceptions to the bicameralism norm: The parts of the Constitution
dealing with impeachment, for example, both provide for
unicameral procedures outside of Article I, Section 7 and designate
those procedures as exclusive. 162 Should the Rules of Proceedings
Clause-with its "may"-be read as the exclusive means of dealing
with its subject? That is, does the grant of unilateral power implicitly
forbid setting rules through the ordinary legislative process? If so,
statutized rules are invalid ab initio.
The question whether each chamber's internal rulemaking
process provides the exclusive method for setting parliamentary rules
is not unlike the controversy over whether the Constitution's Treaty
Clause provides the exclusive procedure for forming major
international agreements. 163 In that debate, Professors Ackerman
and Golove argue that the Treaty Clause, which does not by its own
terms provide that it is the only method for approving international
agreements, should not be understood as limiting Congress's
independent Article I legislative power to pass any law (including
laws that approve international agreements) that is otherwise
necessary and proper to carrying out Congress's relevant enumerated
powers, such as the powers of regulating commerce, declaring war,
160 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983).
161 An earlier draft of the Constitution was even more explicit on this point. One clause
provided that "[t]he house shall have power to make rules for its own government," and a
separate clause accorded the same power to the Senate. RECORDS, supra note 136, at 140, 142.
162 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives... shall have the sole power
of impeachment.") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the
sole power to try all impeachments.") (emphasis added). That these provisions are mandatory
and set forth the exclusive means of effecting impeachment does not mean that the houses do
not possess some discretion over how to carry out their constitutional duties. See Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding nonjusticiable a claim that the Senate violated the
Constitution by allowing a committee to hear evidence against an impeached official then
report to the full Senate for a vote).
163 See supra note 29 (describing the debate).
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and raising armies. 164 The Treaty Clause is not an implicit bar to
using the Article I power to pass otherwise valid legislation. To this
Professor Tribe responds that the various portions of the
Constitution must be read together, and that structural
considerations dictate that the Treaty Clause is meant to describe the
uniquely proper method for concluding major international
agreements, despite the clause's lack of the word "only."165
On its face, the Rules of Proceedings Clause takes the form of a
permission to deviate from the usual legislative procedure of
bicameralism and presentment: "[e]ach House may." According to
an Ackerman/Golove-inspired approach to the clause, the
permission would not be a requirement. Fast track would be
constitutional as long as it was otherwise authorized, and it would be
so authorized because it effectuates Congress's power to set tariffs
and regulate foreign commerce. 166
The non-exclusive reading of the Rules of Proceedings Clause
finds some support in the Supreme Court's reading of a related
constitutional provision. The Constitution gives "each House" the
power to discipline its members; this grant of power, in fact, is part of
the same sentence as the rules power: "Each House may determine
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member."167 In Burton v. United States,168 the Court ruled that this
clause does not mean that Congress cannot regulate its members'
164 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 29, at 811, 913-14, 919-20; see also David M. Golove,
Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 NYU L. REV. 1791 (1998) (further defending the non-exclusive
reading of the Treaty Clause).
165 Tribe, supra note 29, at 1240-45.
166 U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cis. 1 (tariffs), 3 (foreign commerce). Needless to say, the
"necessary and proper" requirement, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, has long been interpreted to
mean something more like "useful." See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324-25
(1819). Whatever else might be said about it, fast track is certainly a "useful" way of dealing
with tariffs and trade. Thus, we need not ask whether fast track is "necessary and proper" to
carrying out the Rules of Proceedings power itself. One could argue that no statute can
properly carry out that power, inasmuch as it is a power of"[e]ach House." SeeVermeule, supra
note 108, at 52. Congress takes a different view, since it explicitly grounds statutized rules in
the rules power; the typical disclaimer clause provides that the measure is "enacted . . .as an
exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively." But even if Congress is incorrect in believing that the Rules of Proceedings
Clause can authorize statutes, the substantive power to regulate commerce still provides a basis
for the enactment.
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
168 202 U.S. 344, 365-68 (1906).
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behavior (in this case, a senator's) through criminal statutes as well.
At issue was a statute making it a crime for government officers
(including senators) to receive payment for representing an
individual before a government agency. In finding that the statute
did not impermissibly interfere with the Senate's constitutional
powers over its members, the Court wrote:
[The Framers] never contemplated that the authority
of the Senate to admit to a seat in its body one who
had been duly elected as a Senator, or its power to
expel him after being admitted, should, in any degree,
limit or restrict the authority of Congress to enact
such statutes, not forbidden by the Constitution, as
the public interests required for carrying into effect
the powers granted to it.169
In the Court's view, each chamber's unilateral power to police its
membership is not a limit on the legislative power. If the Rules of
Proceedings Clause-the textual neighbor of the clause at issue in
Burton-were interpreted analogously, it would not bar a statute that
set internal rules. The crucial caveat, of course, is that the use of the
legislative process to handle internal rules must not be otherwise
forbidden by the Constitution. Even if the text of the Rules of
Proceedings Clause is itself non-exclusive, statutized rules could still
be impermissible for other reasons, such as that they violate the
separation of powers-a point to which we will soon return.
If one were to adopt a Tribe-influenced view, the existence of the
Rules of Proceedings Clause would tend to cast suspicion on using
the statutory form to prescribe internal procedures. But even on this
view, making the case against statutized rules would still require one
to produce an explanation for why allowing rules to be set by statute
would upset the constitutional design. There would need to be
something uniquely appropriate, from the point of view of
constitutional structure, about the particular method of setting rules
contemplated by the Rules of Proceedings Clause. With respect to
the Treaty Clause, one would try to make the case for exclusivity by
arguing that supermajority assent and a special role for the Senate
(with its long-term perspective and equal representation of the
169 Id. at 367.
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states) are uniquely appropriate procedures when considering an
agreement that would fundamentally and durably reconfigure our
relationships with foreign actors; if one understood the significance
of the action at stake, the argument would go, one would see why the
special method of the Treaty Clause bars use of the normal legislative
process. An argument for the exclusivity of the Rules of Proceedings
Clause would have to proceed along analogous lines, pointing to
structural considerations that make it uniquely proper to set
parliamentary rules only through each chamber's internal processes.
As things currently stand, without having yet developed the
separation of powers considerations that inform the Rules of
Proceedings Clause, it remains unclear whether the clause implicitly
forbids statutized rules. Before moving on, however, it is worth
pondering a second question about how to read the clause; namely,
Even if the clause does not forbid Congress from setting an internal
rule through the ordinary statutory process, does the clause
nonetheless give each house the power to abrogate any such statute
through subsequent unilateral action? This is basically the question
whether the Rules of Proceedings Clause commands the result
described by the disclaimer language that Congress typically inserts
in fast track-type laws,170 which language provides that statutory rules
of procedure are enacted with the "full recognition of the
constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as
relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same
manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House."
On this view of the matter, the Rules of Proceedings Clause should
be read to provide that each house may at every moment determine the
rules of its proceedings, despite any statutory enactments to the contrary.
A statutized rule would be just like any other rule of the House or
Senate, regardless of its Article I, Section 7 pedigree and its
placement in the United States Code.
Yet one can hardly state such a proposition without being struck
by its strangeness. It seems natural to think of a valid statute as
possessing greater dignity than an internal rule, just as an applicable
constitutional provision possesses greater dignity than a statute. If a
statute and a rule-both otherwise valid-render conflicting
directions regarding some issue, then should not the statute
170 See supra Section I.B.2.
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control?171 And even Congress takes exactly this view regarding
statutes passed earlier in the same session, holding that they are
binding in matters of procedure. 172 If rules could routinely abrogate
statutes, it would seem that Congress could be, in a meaningful
sense, lawless.
The common sense suspicion of unilateral abrogation is
buttressed by the Supreme Court's holding in INS v. Chadha. Chadha
emphasizes that "[a]mendment and repeal of statutes, no less than
enactment" must follow the norms of bicameralism and
presentment. 173 The Chadha Court found it significant that the one-
house veto at issue in that case was a substitute for-would
"supplant"-action by way of ordinary legislation. 174 But how can we
describe the unilateral decision to change a statutized rule as
anything other than the amendment or repeal of a statute outside of
the constraints of bicameralism and presentment?
The obvious response to the Chadha charge is that a resolution
changing the rules under which a trade bill is considered is not
activity subject to the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. Indeed, Chadha itself recognizes that there are textual
exceptions to the normal requirement that Congress act only via
bicameralism and presentment; the Court's list of exceptions
includes impeachment, treaty approval, and, critically, each
chamber's power to regulate its own internal affairs. 75 This suggests
that Chadha is not even implicated by unilateral abrogation of fast
track rules.
The argument that exercise of the rules power provides an
exception to the usual lawmaking procedure is certainly correct as
far as it goes, but it does not really get at the difficulty here. For here
Congress has not simply acted through the rules process; it has
instead passed a statute that includes rules of debate. And if
Congress has enacted rules into law via a duly passed, valid statute, then
171 The question of the relative weight of rules and statutes arose in a D.C. Circuit case
concerning the voting rights of territorial delegates to the House of Representatives. See Michel
v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that if the statute creating the delegate
positions barred them from voting in the Committee of the Whole, "then that condition would
trump any authority of the House to change its rules unilaterally to grant that power").
172 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
173 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
174 Id. at 952-54.
175 Id. at 955-956, 956 n.20.
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don't we still have to face the fact that "[a]mendment and repeal of
statutes, no less than enactment" must comply with Article I, Section
7? In other words, statutes can be changed only through the
statutory process, even if they deal with subjects that might have been
handled otherwise. 176
One response to that last proposition would be that it is not the
form of a directive that makes the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment apply, but instead its content. The suggestion, in other
words, would be that the legislature's actions could alter provisions of
a statute and yet not be "legislative" in character, and thus not subject
to Article I, Section 7.177 In trying to define what makes an act
"legislative in character," the Chadha Court said that the one-house
vote to deport Mr. Chadha was legislative because it was "action that
had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons, including the Attorney General, executive
branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch."178
But if that is the test, then rescinding a fast track system likely counts
as "legislative" activity too. In the trade context, killing fast track has
"the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch" in that it
strips the president of the right to implement a trade pact through
the expedited process set forth in the statute. (And, practically
speaking, stripping away that prerogative probably torpedoes the
chances of reaching any trade agreement, at least if one believes what
both foreign and domestic officials say about fast track's
importance. 179) That changing a statutized rule is a "legislative" act is
even more clear with respect to those fast track statutes in which
persons outside government are more directly affected, as is true of
the fast track regime governing special appropriations to cover excess
liabilities related to commercial space launch disasters. 80
176 It is, of course, no answer to say that the fast track statute itself licenses subsequent
unilateral action. The same was true of the statute in Chadha.
177 Professor Koh, for instance, has argued that fast track disapproval resolutions are for
this reason constitutional. Koh, supra note 23, at 1216-17. 1217 n.77 (1986). See also Paul R. Q.
Wolfson, Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838, 852-55 (1987) (arguing
that a statute setting forth legislative procedures is not a "legislative" act).
1 78 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
179 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
180 49 U.S.C.A. § 70101 et seq. (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
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If the foregoing line of argument is sound, then much of the
previous thinking about the constitutional status of statutized rules is
incorrect. Not only does the Constitution not require the result
described in the disclaimer clauses that Congress usually inserts into
the statutes, but in fact the Chadha decision might forbid unilateral
abrogation of rules set in statutory form. Yet, all the same, most
people probably have a strong conviction that each chamber should
have the power to change its own rules regardless of any statute to
the contrary, whether or not doing so makes Congress in a sense
"lawless." As happened in the discussion of entrenchment, then, the
analysis of fast track's constitutional status has left us with more
puzzles than answers. The answer to these puzzles, I suggest, can be
found by examining the Rules of Proceedings Clause within its
proper structural context, a task to which I now turn.
B. The Structural Context of the Rules of Proceedings Clause
The Rules of Proceedings Clause does not, all by itself, tell us
whether statutes may properly substitute for internal rules of debate.
To capture the import of the clause, we must see notjust what it says,
but what it does. To that end, this section will draw upon political
science scholarship and positive political theory in particular, to
demonstrate the immense practical importance of control over
legislative rules. A binding fast track regime would have a huge
impact on legislative outcomes. More importantly, it would
accomplish its aim in a way that violates a foundational principle of
separation of powers.
1. Rules of Proceedings and Agenda Control
It is axiomatic that the core function of the legislature is to
legislate. But a legislature could hardly legislate without procedural
rules. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what a legislature without rules
would look like. Who would talk and for how long? What subjects
could be discussed? When would a vote take place? Who gets to tally
the votes?18 1 The thought of a legislature without rules probably
evokes visions of everyone talking at once, but in truth a rule-less
181 In the House of Representatives, where rules do not carry over from one session to the
next, these questions are initially answered by the general parliamentary law reflected in
Jefferson's Manua4 which governs until the new session adopts its own standing rules. HOUSE
MANUAL, supra note 9, § 60.
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assembly would be worse than that, for even the disorganized
legislative mob that we are trying to imagine apparently has rules that
tell it where and when to convene. A legislature could do without
the formal books of rules and precedents we are familiar with, but it
could hardly conduct business without ordering mechanisms of some
sort.
At some level, the choice of rules is merely arbitrary, as in many
cases no particular way of doing things is intrinsically more
meritorious than another. Thomas Jefferson, who was among many
other things one of our first great parliamentarians, wrote that it was
"really not of so great importance" whether the rules selected were
the most rational ones. "It is much more material," he believed, "that
there be a rule to go by than what that rule is."18 2 It would be a grave
error, however, to believe that the choice of rules is unimportant.18 3
On the contrary, as explained below, rules of proceedings determine
outcomes.
Power over the rules is so important precisely because the
Constitution has so little to say about legislative procedure. As a
matter of constitutional text, legislating consists of bicameral passage
followed by presentment to the president. But as a matter of
practical reality, that tells us almost nothing about which statutes will
be enacted. To begin with, legislators will disagree about which
perceived problems require legislative action. Even when a problem
is widely recognized as requiring some response, there may be a
multitude of possible solutions. It will frequently be the case that any
of several bills aimed at a particular problem could potentially win
the support of a majority. Which problems, and which solutions, will
receive the Article I, Section 7 treatment?
Merely to pose that question is to highlight the overriding
importance of agendc control-that is, control over the sequence and
rules under which the legislature considers proposals. Social
scientists employing formal models of voting have produced
powerful conclusions that emphasize the profound impact of
seemingly trivial matters such as the order in which alternatives are
considered. One of the simplest ways to demonstrate this
182 Id. § 285.
183 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 102, at 1365 (incorrectly asserting that "[i]f a bill is destined
to pass, it will pass under any system of rules in effect.").
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phenomenon is through the Condorcet voting paradox. 184 Suppose,
for example, that a majority of the legislature would prefer Option A
over Option B, Option B over Option C, and Option C over Option
A.185 Under such circumstances, the legislators' preferences do not
yield a uniquely preferred outcome. Option A will win if it faces the
winner of a vote between B and C, for instance, but Option C will
prevail if the body first chooses between A and B. Indeed, any of the
outcomes can prevail, given an appropriate manipulation of the
sequence. The outcome therefore depends not upon preferences
but upon control over the agenda.18 6
The voting dynamics just described are not mere hypothetical
possibilities, artifacts of peculiar assumptions about preferences. On
the contrary, the results generalize quite broadly, 18 7 broadly enough
that leading scholars in the field have come to regard such patterns
as "omnipresent in the environment of legislatures."188 And, indeed,
one can point to a number of real-world cases that exemplify the
Condorcet paradox. 89
184 For an introduction to the voting paradox, see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S.
BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS 49-81 (1997). The credit for resurrecting Condorcet's work,
and for recognizing its theoretical importance, belongs largely to DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY
OF COMMITrEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
185 In formal terms, such a preference ordering is referred to as intransitive. Although it is
controversial whether a rational individual can possess preferences of this sort, see JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 103-12 (2001), it is in no way mysterious how a legislature
could display them. Suppose that Congress is debating tax reform. The options are
maintaining the current income tax rates, cutting tax rates on the wealthy, or replacing the
current system with a consumption tax. Suppose further that the legislature consists of three
roughly equally numerous groups: 1) partisans of the status quo, who rank the alternatives
[current system, lower rates, consumption tax]; 2) rate-cutters, who rank them [lower rates,
consumption tax, current system]; and, 3) fairness-minded reformers, who rank them
[consumption tax, current system, lower rates]. If faced with pairwise choices, this Congress
would prefer the current system over lower rates for the wealthy, lower rates for the wealthy
over a consumption tax, and a consumption tax over the current system-an intransitive result.
There is good reason to believe that Congress in fact possessed analogously intransitive
preferences during the debate over the Revenue Act of 1932. See John C. Blydenburgh, The
Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting, 33J. POL. 57, 62-67 (1971).
186 This insight has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in
Multi-Dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472,
480-81 (1976); William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences ofJudicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373, 385 (1988).
187 See, e.g., McKelvey, supra note 186, at 472, 480; Norman Schofield, Generic Instability of
Majority Rule, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 695 (1983).
188 Riker & Weingast, supra note 186, at 384.
189 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 10-17, 34-51, 106-28
(1986); William H. Riker, Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting, in
Journal of Law & Politics
The reason why one does not observe indeterminate voting cycles
more frequently is because of the existence of institutions that
carefully control the legislative agenda. For while the legislature is at
bottom a collection of preference-bearing individuals-and as such is
subject to the pathologies described above-its simple foundation is
adorned with a variety of decision-shaping structures and procedures.
The committees and their chairmen are perhaps chief among these,
and a large literature has highlighted their role as agenda-setters. 190
Likewise, the whole foundation of the considerable institutional
power of the House Rules Committee derives from its ability to
control the sequence and circumstances of debate-that is, to
manipulate the agenda.191
Since the legislature's internal structures and procedures
determine the outcome of otherwise indeterminate preference
patterns, congressional decisionmaking thus provides an example of
structure-induced equilibrium.92 And recall that very few of these
crucial equilibrium-inducing structures are constitutionalized-the
requirement of bicameral passage of identical text and the
requirement that revenue bills originate in the House of
Representatives being the most prominent exceptions. 193 Apart from
these minimal directives, the remainder is for Congress to decide
through its Rules of Proceedings power.
MATHEMATICAL APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 41 (John M. Claunch ed., 1965);
Blydenburgh, supra note 185, at 62-67.
190 See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973).
191 Other institutions, such as political parties and their leadership structures, play similarly
critical roles in stabilizing legislative outcomes. See, e.g., Gary W. Cox & Matthew D.
McCubbins, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993); Gary W. Cox
& Matthew D. McCubbins, Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government
in the House, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 101 (Kenneth A. Shepsle
& Barry Weingast eds., 1995); John H. Aldrich, A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a
Committee System, in id. at 173.
192 The leading early contributions to the theory of structure-induced equilibrium in
legislatures include Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in
Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCL 27 (1979); and Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry
R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981). A
large body of scholarship has built upon those contributions; see, e.g., POSITIVE THEORIES OF
CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 191; and Douglas Dion, The Robustness of Structure-
Induced Equilibrium, 36 AM. J. POL. SC. 462 (1992). For a recent review of the literature on the
effects of parliamentary rules, see Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, in
LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 247 (Gerhard
Loewenberg ed., 2002).
193 Even with respect to the latter, the constitutional requirement has little practical bite.
See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397-401 (1990).
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With these considerations in mind, we can see the Rules of
Proceedings Clause in a new light. Far from being a small bit of
housekeeping, it assumes a role near the center of the legislative
function. The Rules of Proceedings Clause is bicameralism and
presentment at work, legislation as it plays out on the ground,
lawmaking getting its hands dirty. Legislators realize that voting
rules and other procedural details determine outcomes, and that is
why they wrangle over such matters so fiercely, much to the
befuddlement of outsiders.194
How does fast track fit into this picture? What binding statutized
rules would do, among other things, is erode each chamber's power
to set its own agenda. The president's agenda becomes the
Congress's agenda. This switch in control manifests itself in a
number of ways, including the timing and content of legislative
action.
a. Timing
Under fast track rules, the president's implementation bill "shall
be introduced" and referred to the appropriate committee on the
day the president sends the bill to Congress. 195 If the committee does
not report the bill within forty-five days, it is "automatically"
discharged and placed on the chamber's calendar. 196 The whole
house must then vote on the bill within fifteen days. 197 Thus, the
president can always count on his trade agreement being voted upon
within sixty days of sending it to Congress.
While this might not seem like a serious imposition, to view it as a
"mere" matter of scheduling is to miscomprehend the workings of
the legislature. As an institution, Congress can consider only a
limited number of significant proposals in any given session.
Oftentimes crucial bills will languish for months, finally passing only
in a final flurry of deal-making and voting that precedes
adjournment. In part this reality is a result of the difficult and time-
consuming nature of legislating in the modem Congress.198  But
much is the result of carefully orchestrated political maneuvering
194 William H. Riker, Comment on Baker, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 791, 791 (1991).
'95 19 U.S.CA. § 2191(c) (West Supp. 2003).
19 6 Id. § 21 91 (e).
197 Id.
198 See supra Section 1A (describing the legislative process and vetogates).
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between the majority and the minority, the leadership and
backbenchers, or the White House and Congress. As all of these
political actors recognize, the "mere" timing of a vote can mean
nearly everything.
The power that fast track would grant the president comes into
greater focus if one considers the political dimensions of a trade
vote. The vote on a significant trade agreement will likely draw
considerable media coverage, not to mention the keen interest of
both unions and business groups. Legislators pay intense attention
to the scheduling of such salient votes, especially when elections are
looming. In the run-up to the 2002 midterm election, for example,
some Democrats had hoped to postpone a vote on authorizing force
against Iraq until after the election. The Bush Administration, on
the other hand, wanted to force a vote before the election, knowing
that politically vulnerable doves would feel constrained to give the
president a vote of confidence. 19 9 As it happened, the vote did occur
before the election, but not because President Bush had any legal
means of forcing a vote. With fast track's guaranteed speedy
consideration, in contrast, the president could compel Congress to
take a stand on politically sensitive issues when he chooses, not when
a majority of legislators do. He could time the vote to maximize the
chances of passage, or indeed to advance any aim he likes.
b. Content
A binding fast track regime would drastically alter the two
branches' relative control over the content of legislation. The
following diagram provides an illustration of the effect.2 00
SQ C C' P
Point SQ represents the position of the current status quo policy.
In the trade context, it could represent the relatively high level of
tariffs and related protections that characterize our relations with
199 Julie Mason & Cynthia Lee, Bush to UN.: Act Now on Iraq; Push for War Vote May Be
Casualty of Politics on Hill, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 13, 2002, at Al.
200 As the reader may recognize, this form of modeling is similar to that found in KEITH
KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 3-48 (1998); and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The
Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 CEO. LJ. 523 (1992).
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countries with whom we have not signed a free trade agreement.
(This model of the legislative process could of course describe any
policy area, not just trade.) Let us assume that if Congress were the
only policymaker, it would set its ideal policy at C.201 That is,
Congress would prefer that trade be somewhat freer than under the
status quo. Finally, let us suppose (not at all implausibly) that the
president would most prefer a policy set at P, which is significantly
less protectionist than either the status quo or C.202 Under Article I,
Section 7, Congress generally has a first-mover advantage.
Therefore, given the preferences shown above, Congress could pass a
bill at C, and the president would sign it because he prefers C to the
status quo.203 We can therefore expect a policy of XY"". We can
think of this result as the constitutional baseline.
It might at first seem that this baseline could not describe the
trade context, since Congress cannot implement a congressional-
executive agreement unless the administration first negotiates it.
And without the usual first-mover advantage, it would seem to follow
that Congress could not set trade policy at its preferred point, C. It
would appear, therefore, that in the trade context the administration
could set policy as far to the right as C', the point at which Congress
would be indifferent between retaining the status quo and adopting
the administration's proposal. Yet this impression is misleading, for
even if the president negotiated an agreement barely palatable to
Congress-such as one that set policy at C'-under the usual rules of
legislative procedure Congress could still move policy back toward C.
Congress could do this in two ways. First, it may be that the same
agreement could be implemented in domestic law in more than one
way. For instance, where the pact leaves U.S. obligations ambiguous,
Congress could take a more protectionist approach to
implementation than the president would prefer.20 4 Much more
importantly, however, even without tinkering with U.S. obligations
201 Because of bicameralism, vetogates, the Senate filibuster, etc., C does not simply
represent the preferences of the median legislator.
202 The president's preferences are not an accident. The president represents a national
constituency and is thus predictably less disposed to protectionist measures.
2 0 3 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 200.
204 Uncertainties often arise regarding the extent to which domestic law must be changed
to conform with an international agreement. In the domain of copyright, for instance, there
was a long-running debate over whether the Berne Convention Implementation Act sufficed to
bring U.S. law into compliance with the Convention. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02
(2003).
2003] 399
Journal of Law & Politics
under the trade agreement, Congress could normally amend the
implementing bill with add-on measures that, on balance, move
overall policy to C. In 2000, for instance, Congress was able to agree
to a bill implementing China's accession to the WTO by tacking on
provisions creating a human rights watchdog commission.2 5 Thus,
under normal legislative procedures, Congress could take a
presidential implementation bill located at C' and turn it into an
implementation bill located at C. The president would sign this
amended bill because he prefers it to the status quo. Under the
usual rules of debate, therefore, trade policy will be set at )& ,
which matches the usual result under Article I, Section 7.
The situation is quite different under fast track. Because the
president can force a quick vote, and because amendments are
barred, the president can present Congress with a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition. In the diagram above, Congress will take any measure
set at or to the left of C1. Therefore, under a binding fast track
regime, we can expect policy to be set at Xr .
To be sure, the model presented above is quite simplified and
ignores certain dynamics of the inter-branch bargaining process. All
the same, the basic insight it illustrates meshes quite comfortably
with results in the political science literature. Scholars who have
studied the strategic effect of amendment rules have shown that a
system of closed rules (that is, rules barring amendment)
systematically advantages the person proposing a measure, allowing
the proposal-maker to set policy closer to his preferred outcome than
he could under a system of open rules.206 The divergence between
X" and Xr reflects the fact that fast track is a regime of closed rules
with the president as proposal-maker. Likewise, research on
referenda-which, like fast track, present the voters with
unamendable, take-it-or-leave-it choices-has demonstrated that the
party who has the procedural power to make the proposal enjoys a
tremendous advantage over those who vote on it. In particular, the
more the majority dislikes the fall-back point (that is, SQin this case),
205 Tiefer, supra note 10, at 470-71.
206 See David P. Baron, A Sequential Choice Theo-y Perspective on Legislative Organization, in
POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 191, at 71, 84-85; David P.




the greater the agenda-setter's power to shift policy toward her own
preferences.207
The move from Xv6 to Xr is a major shift in terms of policy
outcomes, but it is more than just that. It is a reversal of the relative
policy-setting power of the president and the legislature. The
president's political power under fast track is analogous to the
economic power of a monopolist. A monopolist sets prices at the
level that maximizes profits, and consumers in such a market must
act as price-takers. In the same way, fast track makes the president a
proposal-maker who, by setting policy at CI, can appropriate to
himself all of the benefits from changing the status quo. It is a
qualitative reversal of roles, not just a (hard to measure) quantitative
difference between X" and Xr .
Presidential monopoly power is not the Constitution's vision of
the relationship between president and Congress. Under Article I,
Section 7, it is the legislature that occupies the dominant role in the
legislative process, possessing both the first move and, in the case of a
veto, the last move in the game. Deviating from this usual
arrangement, the Constitution grants the president the power to
make take-it-or-leave-it proposals in only the most limited
circumstances. Notably, the president can appoint executive officers
and judges with the advice and consent of the Senate.20 8 The
president's appointments therefore need only be minimally palatable
to Congress.209 The power of appointment is thus an area in which
the president does (and arguably should) have a greater say than
Congress. But this arrangement is not the usual rule, so far as the
Constitution sees it.
As a way of resisting the conclusion that fast track marks a
significant departure from the Constitution's usual vision of
lawmaking, one might argue that trade agreements should be an
exception to the background norm of legislative price-setting. For
what are we to make of the fact that the Constitution provides that
207 See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political
Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q.J. ECON. 563, 564 (1979); Thomas Romer
& Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB.
CHOICE 27, 27-28, 35-36 (1978).
208 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
209 Baron and Ferejohn note that the presidential appointment power is an example of the
"power to propose" and predict that the president should receive "asymmetric payoffs" vis-4-vis
the legislature. David P. Baron & John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC
CHOICE IN POLITICS 343, 366 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989).
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"[the president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur"?210  Like the president's appointment
power, this clause also contemplates the president as proposer. If
implementation of presidentially negotiated trade pacts as ordinary
legislation has over time come to substitute for the ratification of
treaties, 211 then fast track would perhaps not really be upsetting the
usual constitutional balance. If anything, it would be restoring a
result closer to what the Treaty Clause envisions. Fast track would be
a second-best constitutional settlement, given the obsolescence of the
formal treaty route. We could call this the equilibrium-restoration
defense of fast track.
While promising, the foregoing defense is too quick in assuming
that the Treaty Clause is the proper baseline for comparison. On the
one hand, as emphasized above, 212  fast track regimes exist
throughout the U.S. Code, notjust in the trade policy context that is
the focus of this paper. The Treaty Clause is not the relevant
constitutional baseline against which to assess, to choose one
example, the fast track regime that allows the Secretary of Energy to
submit bills to implement contracts to purchase oil for the strategic
reserves.
213
On the other hand, even within the realm of international trade,
it is doubtful that many of the agreements subject to fast track should
be considered "treaties" within the meaning of the Treaty Clause. To
be sure, the distinguishing feature of "treaties" is contested, with
some scholars positing a subject-matter test 2 14 and others holding
210 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
211 See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 29 (tracing the decline of the formal treaty);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e
(1987) ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an
alternative to the treaty method in every instance."). But see Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive
Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEx. L. REv. 961, 993-1009 (2001) (questioning
whether treaties and congressional-executive agreements have in practice become
interchangeable instruments).
212 Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
213 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 1990 § 6(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. 6249c
(2000).
214 See John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congreasional-Executive
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REv. 757 (2001). Yoo writes:
[T]he normal statutory mode must be used to approve international
agreements that regulate matters within Congress's Article I powers. The
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that the determinative factor is the degree of sovereignty at stake.215
On the subject-matter test, the Constitution's grant of power over
foreign commerce to Congress would imply that trade agreements
are properly handled via implementing legislation, not the treaty
process. 216 Nor would the vast bulk of trade agreements count as
treaties on the degree-of-sovereignty test. Even if an arrangement as
far-reaching as the WTO Agreement should arguably be done as a
treaty, an agreement lowering trade barriers to Chilean agricultural
products almost certainly would not rise to the same level.2 17 So the
better baseline for measuring fast track is Article I, Section 7, not the
Treaty Clause.
Finally, even if the Treaty Clause were the proper baseline, the
equilibrium-restoration defense of fast track misunderstands the
nature of that baseline. That defense, recall, posited that fast track
simply returns the constitutional center of gravity to the executive
branch, where it purportedly resides under the Treaty Clause. But
the Treaty Clause requires the assent of two-thirds of the Senate,
putting the president at the mercy of a potentially parochial
minority.218 Moreover, as against fast track's bar on amendments, the
device of the congressional-executive agreement ensures that the same
public lawmaking process will apply to the same subjects, regardless of
whether an international agreement is involved or not. This approach
leaves ample room for treaties, which still must be used if the nation seeks
to make agreements outside of Congress's competence or bind itself in
areas where both President and Congress exercise competing, overlapping
powers.
Id. at 764.
215 See Tribe, supra note 29, at 1268 (stating that "one must consider the degree to which
an agreement constrains federal or state sovereignty and submits United States citizens or
political entities to the authority of bodies wholly or partially separate from the ordinary arms
of federal or state government").
2 16 Yoo, supra note 214, at 822-25.
217 Compare Tribe, supra note 29, at 1267 n.156 (asserting that the WTO Agreement
burdens national and state sovereignty enough to demand approval as a treaty) uth id. at 1277
n.195 (conceding that "[a]n analysis of [NAFTA and bilateral trade agreements] might suggest
that much of what they accomplish-such as the setting of tariff rates-would not so affect state
or national sovereignty as to require Treaty Clause procedures").
218 Indeed, the vulnerability of the treaty process to the objections of a recalcitrant
minority of Senators is a leading reason that congressional-executive agreements became
preferred. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 29, at 861-66; see also Spiro, supra note 211, at
1004 (noting that "[h]istorical experience-and indeed the origins of the congressional-
executive agreement-would seem to indicate that the Senate route presents the higher hurdle
[than a majority of both Houses]." (citation omitted)). NAFTA garnered majorities in both
chambers, but it did not receive a two-thirds supermajority in the Senate. See 139 Cong. Rec.
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Senate, with relative frequency, adds reservations and declarations to
its assent to treaties. 219 Thus, compared to fast track, the treaty
process is not especially favorable to the president, and it would likely
produce an equilibrium significantly to the left of X. Fast track is
more favorable to the president than either the Treaty Clause or
Article I.
I have argued that a binding fast track regime would work a
systematic shift in policymaking power between the executive and
legislative branches, a shift that reverses the Constitution's usual
path. The response to this structural argument would be that the
statutorily created rules of procedure that accomplish this shift of
power do not purport to be irreversible: Even if statutized rules
stripped each chamber of its unilateral power to determine its rules,
the statutized rules could still be changed by amending the law that
created them. The possibility of changing the procedures to
reestablish the constitutional status quo does not suffice to eliminate
the structural problem, however. The reason is not merely that the
statutory route is difficult, for legislating is always difficult, especially
when the veto-wielding president is hostile to the change. Instead,
the trouble is that the statutory route gives the president a say over
the rules at all. The president's participation in this matter offends a
very old principle of the separation of powers, as explained next.
2. Master in One's Own House
In one category of separation of powers case, the problem is that
one branch of government is arguably carrying out a function
entrusted to another branch. Thus, in the celebrated Steel Seizure
case, the majority thought that the crucial question was the nature of
the activity of seizing the steel mills. If it was an exercise of the
legislative power, then it was forbidden to the president, for only
Congress can properly exercise that power.220 Likewise, in Bowsher v.
Synar, the crucial step was the determination that the Comptroller
S16, 712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993). Ackerman and Golove argue that obtaining the
additional votes in the Senate would have been "a formidable task." Ackerman & Golove, supra
note 29, at 927 n.5.
219 See Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 89, 91 (1996) (estimating that approximately 15% of treaties have been
approved subject to such conditions).
220 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
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General's activities under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings were executive
in nature; and since they were executive, they could not be
performed by an agent under Congress's control.2 1 Q.E.D.
Whatever else might be said about fast track, it cannot really be
said that it lets one branch perform a function vested in a coordinate
branch. Congress is still legislating, after all, and the president is still
signing laws and executing them. But, all the same, Congress and
the president are working together very differently when they operate
under fast track rules. The statutized rule says that Congress cannot
amend the president's bill, cannot schedule the bill as it pleases,
cannot filibuster, and so on. Changing a binding statutized rule
would require action by both chambers and, unless two-thirds of each
chamber agrees, help from the president himself (who is, of course,
most unlikely to grant it). As the previous section demonstrated,
these changes have profound effects on legislative outcomes.
The policymaking influence that the president gains at the
legislature's expense under binding statutized rules suggests that fast
track might implicate a second general family of separation of powers
violations-those which occur when a branch is unduly burdened in
carrying out its constitutional duties. Admittedly, the doctrine in this
area is not wholly clear, and when cases of this sort reach the courts,
the outcomes tend to be unpredictable. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
Supreme Court balanced competing values and found that
permitting a civil damage suit arising out of the president's official
acts would impermissibly "intru[de] on the authority and functions
of the Executive Branch."222 But in Morrison v. Olson, in stark
contrast, the Court found that the creation of an "independent
counsel" to investigate high-ranking executive officials did not
"unduly interfer[e] with the role of the Executive Branch."223
How would one go about demonstrating that fast track is a
violation of this sort? One could start by saying that the dislocations
221 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986).
222 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982). In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger expanded
upon the separation of powers rationale for the president's immunity. See id. at 758.
223 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988). Under the Ethics in Government Act, the independent
counsel was appointed by a special panel of federal judges upon application by the Attorney
General. Congress could request an investigation pursuant to the Act; upon receiving such a
request, the Attorney General was required to seek the appointment of an independent
counsel unless there were "no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation [was]
warranted." Once appointed, the independent counsel could be removed by the Attorney
General only in limited cases. Id. at 659-69.
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identified in the previous section are so serious as surely to qualify as
"undue interference" or "excessive intrusion," even admitting the
muddiness around the borders of those concepts. In the case at
hand, however, we can do better than rely on those amorphous
labels, for fast track implicates a more particular (and quite old)
principle that lies behind much of the doctrine. The content of this
principle will be developed in greater detail as we proceed, but it can
be expressed in rough terms as the requirement that each branch be
"master in [its] own house."2 24 A bit more formally, the requirement
is that no branch be beholden to another as respects its own internal
affairs.
The operative notion of non-beholdenness has resonances in
republican conceptions of freedom and independence familiar to
the founding generation. Contrary to today's prevailing view, on
which we conceive of liberty in terms of the absence of constraint,
the republican view was that a person was unfree when he lived in a
state of susceptibility to mastery or domination.2 25 The paradigm
case of unfreedom in this tradition was the life of a slave or servant,
not because his master necessarily interfered with his actions, but
because the servant was always vulnerable to his lord's caprices, or
else had to resort to flattery and fawning in order to win favor.226 A
slave was therefore unfree even if a kindly master never prevented
him from doing as he pleased.
224 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935). A methodological
note about the status of this "principle" may be in order here. What the Constitution has to say
about the separation of powers (as well as other structural issues like federalism) cannot be
distilled into a single short formula. Many types of violation are possible, and there is no single
test to detect them all. The Constitution does, however, give rise to a number of heuristic
structural principles, each of which helps us identify a particular structural concern. For
example, the anti-commandeering principle of recent federalism cases, see Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), alerts us to a
particular sort of federal interference with state governmental processes. Likewise, some
separation of powers cases reflect the importance of a conflict of interest principle. See Paul R.
Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301 (1989). The principle at issue in this paper has the same ontological status.
225 On the republican view of liberty as non-domination, see generally PHILIP PETTIT,
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997); and QUENTIN SKINNER,
LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998). The republicanism at issue here-whose intellectual
history stretches from Cicero through Machiavelli to the English Civil War and the American
Revolution-should be distinguished from the participatory "civic republicanism" that
currently attracts a great deal of attention.




For the Founders, it was obvious that a government of separated
powers abhorred a servile dependence of one department of
government upon another. "If it be essential to the preservation of
liberty that the Legisl[ative], Execut[ive] & Judiciary powers be
separate," Madison said at the Convention, "it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of
each other."2 27 Madison's statement might at first look like a mere
tautology, but it is not. "Independent of," as used in this context, is
not just a synonym for "separated"; it means instead "not dependent
upon," as becomes clear as Madison continues:
The Executive could not be independent of the
Legislure [sic], if dependent on the pleasure of that
branch for a re-appointment. Why was it determined
that the Judges should not hold their places by such a
tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate
the Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus
render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well
the maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence
of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it
the Executor as well as the maker of laws; & then
according to the observation of Montesquieu,
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be
executed in a tyrannical manner. 228
A president whose re-election was in the legislature's hands would
be, in a palpably plain sense, beholden to that body. And this servile
dependence, Madison thought, was the path to the tyranny of
consolidated authority that the separation of powers hoped to avoid.
(And this is true even though a dependent president would still be
executing the law, a dominant legislature still legislating, and so on.)
As Professor Nourse's work on these matters has shown, the
discourse of inter-branch beholdenness was the Framers' chief idiom
for conceptualizing the separation of powers. 229
227 2 RECORDS, supra note 136, at 34 (July 17, 1787) (emphasis added).
228 Id.
229 See Nourse, supra note 20, at 459-63.
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These same issues motivate the Supreme Court's analysis in old
cases like Myers v. United States,230 one of the most important cases for
understanding this face of the separation of powers. The immediate
question at issue in that case was whether a postmaster, an executive
officer appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the
Senate, could be removed by the president acting alone,
notwithstanding a statute that purported to condition removal, like
appointment, on the Senate's consent. Chief Justice (formerly
President) Taft's majority opinion covers a broad swath of
constitutional history and doctrine in the course of consuming some
seventy pages in the U.S. Reports. He finds persuasive the claim that
removal is in the nature of "executive power,"231 as well as the view
that the power of removal necessarily follows from the president's
power to appoint (not from the Senate's inferior power of
consenting to appointments),232 and above all Taft approves the
notion that the power to remove is implicit in the president's duty to
"take care that the law be faithfully executed."23 3  The real
psychological lynchpin, though, is the idea of dependence. The
Chief Justice quotes Madison's comments from the 1789
congressional debate over removal of certain cabinet officers:
If the President should possess alone the power of
removal from office, those who are employed in the
execution of the law will be in their proper situation,
and the chain of dependence be preserved; the lowest
officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will
depend, as they ought, on the President, and the
President on the community.234
Officials are dependent upon those who can remove them. If the
men and women within the president's own administration are
dependent for their livelihood on the legislators, not on the
president, then the executive ceases to be an independent, and thus
230 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
231 Id. at 115-18.
232 Id. at 122, 126-27.
233 Id. at 117-18, 122, 131-33.
234 Id. at 131 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 518 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
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separate, department of government.2 35 Elsewhere in the quoted
passage, Madison expresses the point in a way that seems overly
alarmist today-warning of executive officers 'join[ing] in cabal with
the Senate"236 -but the threat, as valid as a psychological matter
today as then, is simply that the president's subordinates will end up
doing the bidding of the Senate. Experience under the state
constitutions had in fact shown the dangers of legislative dominance
of the executive,2 37 and such combinations of power were exactly
what the new Constitution was meant to avoid.
Now, we should be careful to recognize the limits of this evident
rule of non-dependence as it applies to the presidency. It is
axiomatic that executive officers, including even the president,
execute the directives of a superior policymaker. The president's
legitimate authority over his administration does not, in the usual
case, extend to countermanding legislative commands. Nor does the
Constitution vest the president with sole control over executive
appointments.23 8 Moreover, the president is ultimately dependent
upon the legislature in that he may be impeached. Executive
independence should be understood as a background principle that
applies in the absence of specific textual efforts to restrain the
president.2 39
No similar textual derogations from the presumption of
independence can be found with respect to the legislature. On the
contrary, in the Constitution one finds repeated affirmations of the
legislature's sovereignty over its own internal affairs. For example,
235 The executive's need for autonomy over its internal affairs requires not only that the
president have control over his people but also that he have "independent authority to control
his own time and energy," Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 711 (Breyer, J., concurring), a
principle that can in some cases let him avoid or delayjudicial proceedings.
236 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 480.
237 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 144, at 277 ("The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex."); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 407
("The governors were mere ciphers, almost totally dependent on the legislatures, with little or
no power to resist or control the political and social instability.").
238 Presidents have sometimes insisted that the separation of powers entitles them to a
circle of close advisors whose selection cannot be conditioned upon Senatorial consent. See
Douglas S. Onley, Note, Treading on Sacred Ground: Congress's Power to Subject White House Advisors
to Senate Confirmation, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1183 (1996).
239 Madison took this view. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 516-17.
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the Arrest Clause and Speech or Debate Clause, 240 which respond
largely to the Stuart monarchs' use of seditious libel prosecutions
against opposition MPs, provide our legislators with protection from
"intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly
hostile judiciary."241 "Otherwise," Thomas Jefferson explained in his
parliamentary Manual, "it would be in the power of other branches
of the government ... to take any man from his service in the House,
and so, as many, one after another, as would make the House what he
pleaseth."242 Members are accountable to their colleagues and to their
constituents for what they say in debate, but the other branches
cannot be the master of what happens within the chamber.
Even more fundamentally, the constitutional design safeguards
the legislature's internal sovereignty by protecting its members'
institutional allegiances. The Constitution's Incompatibility Clause 243
forbids members of Congress from holding positions in the executive
branch. The rule responded to the practice on the part of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British monarchs, as well as of
royal governors in the Colonies, of holding out highly remunerative
offices, pensions, and titles to members of the legislature. 244 Yoked
with these corrupting incentives, the so-called "placemen" could
reliably be counted upon to rubberstamp the king's proposals. The
incompatibility rule sought to prevent legislators from becoming
dependent on the executive in this way, much the same as Myers does
for the reverse situation.
The constitutional importance of the legislature enjoying a
protected sphere of control over its internal affairs trumps functional
240 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at
the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned
in any other place."). The Articles of Confederation included a similar guarantee. SeeARTS. OF
CONFED. Art. V, cl. 5.
241 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181-82 (1966). The Johnson court quotes
Madison's remarks in The Federalist and states that "[t]he legislative privilege, protecting against
possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one
manifestation of the 'practical security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature." Id
at 179.
242 HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 305 (emphasis added).
243 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
244 See generally Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 20, at 1053-62 (describing the historical
background of the Incompatibility Clause).
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mismatches that might otherwise raise separation of powers issues.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress performs a number
of "executive" activities that relate to its own management: "the
Capitol Police can arrest and press charges against lawbreakers, the
Sergeant at Arms manages the congressional payroll, the Capitol
Architect maintains the buildings and grounds, and its Librarian has
custody of a vast number of books and records. '245 The Constitution
also directs the legislature to perform apparently "adjudicative"
functions-such as being "the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members"246 -when the activities implicate
matters that go to the heart of the department's institutional
existence. Commenting on that clause, Justice Story pointed out the
practical wisdom of such a provision: "If [the powers were] lodged in
any other [body] than the legislative body itself, its independence, its
purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed, or put
into imminent danger. No other body, but itself, can have the same
motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes. '247  These
provisions therefore do not derogate from the separation of powers;
they bolster it.
The Rules of Proceedings Clause, we are now in a position to see,
is continuous with, and informed by, these other parts of the
constitutional design. This is not to suggest that high theory directly
prompted the adoption of the clause; for, on the contrary, it
attracted almost no debate. 248 Nonetheless, the Clause embodies the
principle that, in a quite literal way, each chamber is to be "master in
[its] own house." Just as the Incompatibility Clause hopes to ensure
that legislators are psychologically governed by their own
institutional and electoral incentives, not the executive's financial
245 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 753 (1986) (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Similar comments could be made with respect to the judiciary's
relationship to marshals. See generally Penn. Bureau of Corr. v. United States Marshals Serv.,
474 U.S. 34, 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting the history of the relationship between the
courts and the marshals).
246 U.S. COWL art I, § 5, cl. 1.
247 STORY, supra note 155, § 831. Adrian Vermeule argues that Story's view is fallacious as a
matter of constitutional design because it overlooks both the costs of legislative autonomy
(such as self-dealing and majority opportunism) and the possible benefits of disinterested
review. Vermeule, supra note 108, at 25. In my view, the better interpretation is that Story and
the Framers believed that legislative autonomy over such matters was so important as to justify
the risks, not that they were inattentive to them.
248 Supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
2003]
Journal of Law & Politics
inducements, the rules power ensures that legislators are self-
governing as a practical matter. Both are aimed at the same
problem: namely, ensuring that the legislature is a vital and
independent voice, not merely a rubber stamp for the executive's
proposals. Fast track, of course, moves toward the latter situation by
limiting debate and forbidding amendment.
When issues such as a chamber's rules of debate, internal
discipline, and members' election contests are made matters of
statutory law, the president (and the other chamber) gains a voice
over them. Even if both chambers wish to change their own rules of
debate, under a regime of statutized rules they can do so only with
the president's approval, unless they can manage a supermajority in
both houses. If only one house wishes to change the law, it is
completely helpless to do so. Constitutionally speaking, these are
areas where the president, and even the other chamber of Congress,
has no business playing the role of master. And it is no response to
say that both houses consented to this arrangement when the
original statute was passed, for that is true of the Line Item Veto Act
and every other statute that would impair the legislature's
constitutional stature.2 49 Unilateral control over rules of proceedings
is (along with other features of legislative self-governance)
constitutive of the body's independence, and so, in the Framers'
view, of its institutional separateness.
C. Implications
So where does all of this leave us? The task was to find the proper
context in which to understand the grant of power in the Rules of
Proceedings Clause. Standing alone, the clause was ambiguous with
respect to the question whether the statutory form was available to set
parliamentary rules. The separation of powers considerations
adduced above resolve that ambiguity by elucidating the
constitutionally relevant consequences of setting rules with statutes.
Statutory rules like fast track shift policymaking power to the
president in a way that reverses the normal rules of the legislative
game, essentially making the president into a policy monopolist.
Moreover, the president attains this power in a way particularly
249 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. ...
Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.").
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offensive to the Constitution-namely, by wielding a share of control
over the legislature's internal affairs. The Rules of Proceedings
Clause should therefore be read as describing the exclusive means of
determining rules of debate.
The analysis offered here does not mean that a statutized rule is
void ab initio. The statute setting the rules was passed by majorities of
both houses, and that is all that is required to set a rule. 250
Therefore, when a measure subject to special statutized rules comes
up for a vote, the statutized rule should initially apply so long as the
statute remains in force.251 The statutized rule applies only as a
default, however, since each house must retain exclusive control over
its own rules. If one house chooses to change the rules, its action
does not violate Chadha since the original statute could not purport,
as a matter of constitutional law, to require the chamber to follow
rules with which it disagreed. In sum, a statutized rule of debate is
valid but voidable.
CONCLUSION
Ranging over fields from the budget process to trade agreements,
laws governing the lawmaking process are an important and growing
phenomenon. This Article has attempted to provide an account of
their constitutional status. As described in Part II, the conventional
view is that statutized rules implicate the anti-entrenchment norm,
250 Senate Rules V and XXII require a supermajority to end debate on a motion to change
the rules, but a majority suffices to pass the underlying proposal. On the Senate's rules
process, see generally supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
251 That the statutized rule remains in effect past the session when it was adopted does not
pose constitutional difficulties. In the Senate, all rules continue in force indefinitely until
amended. Supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. In the House, it is true that it has
become the practice to adopt new rules at the beginning of each session. But this does not
mean that the Constitution forbids rules from carrying over. On the contrary, the House's
practice for the first hundred years of the Republic was that rules could carry over; the old rules
remained in effect unless and until the new session changed them. See 5 HINDS' PRECEDENTS,
supra note 83, §§ 6743-47 (recounting the history on this point). The prohibition is only on
one session trying to continue over its rules against the will of a successor. There is therefore
no bar on statutized rules persisting from one session to the next, subject to being abrogated at
any time. In any case, little of practical import turns on this point, as the rules adopted at the
beginning of a session typically include a provision re-adopting existing statutized rules. See,
e.g., HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 388; H.R. Res. 5, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted) (adopting
"applicable provisions of law or concurrent resolution [s] that constituted rules of the House at
the end of the One Hundred Seventh Congress"). The current version of House Rule XXVIII
provides, in part, that "[t]he provisions of law that constituted the Rules of the House at the
end of the previous Congress shall govern the House in all cases to which they are applicable."
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which forbids one Congress from binding its successors. I noted that
this view was strange, since statutes like fast track in no way try to
prevent their own repeal by later legislation. The problem with fast
track is not that it represents a cross-temporal power-grab in which a
current Congress aggrandizes itself at the expense of a later one, but
that it effects a horizontal shift in power between the Congress and
president. Or, more precisely, to the extent there is any issue of
cross-temporal impairment, later legislatures are only impaired
because of that horizontal shift.
The entrenchment view also confronted the puzzle that, if binding
one's successors was the problem, statutized rules probably do not
cause that prohibited effect to any worse degree than would the
normal rules process. This was because the Senate's burdensome
internal procedures for changing the rules quite possibly make it
easier to change the Senate's rules through ordinary legislation. 252
And if that were so, it would be difficult to complain about statutized
rules on the ground that they entrenched themselves.
If entrenchment is not the problem with statutized rules, then the
relative difficulty of changing the rules is beside the point. What
matters is who gets to decide. Under the Constitution, the choice
belongs to each house alone, and the other players are to have no
role. That the Senate's rules are extremely hard to change may be a
problem, perhaps even a constitutional one, but it is not the same
type of problem as besets fast track.
The separation of powers approach developed in Part III joins in
the entrenchment critique's general conclusions about statutized
rules, but it aims to reach those conclusions in a more theoretically
satisfying way. In at least one important case, however, the two
approaches yield different practical results. Recall that Congress
does apparently feel bound in matters of procedure by statutes
passed earlier in the same session.253 This result is consistent with the
entrenchment approach, but it is problematic on the separation of
powers view. Through the lens of the latter, the trouble is that the
chamber operating under the statutized rule lacks exclusive,
unilateral control over its procedures; to change them, it must get
the consent of the other house and the president (or, if both houses
are willing but the president is not, large supermajorities in both
252 Supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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chambers are needed). We need not answer the question whether a
chamber may, by acting through the unilateral rules process,
constrain itself to follow a certain rule throughout a session.
Whatever the answer to that question, legislators may not achieve
that aim through ceding power to a coordinate branch.
Viewing the Rules of Proceedings Clause as an expression of a
principle of internal autonomy adds context to the clause's
inconclusive text. It was easy to conclude that the clause grants a
permission to set rules unilaterally, but it was unclear whether the
clause should be taken as the exclusive method of setting the rules,
acting as a limit on the legislature's broad power to pass any statutes
useful in attaining permissible aims. Moreover, in light of Chadha, it
was puzzling how Congress could purport to "amend" a statutized
rule through unilateral action. By considering the separation of
powers aspect of the rules power, we can now see why the power to
set the rules is always reposed in each house. A decision to deviate
from the statutized rule does not "amend" the statute, for the statute
could not, as a matter of constitutional law, purport to commit the
legislature to follow rules not of its choosing in the first place. This is
of course not to say that, when a bill subject to the special procedures
comes up for debate, the house cannot accede to using those
procedures. But it may always choose not to follow them, exercising
its constitutionally mandated power to choose. This may well be a
cause for sadness, for the ability to commit oneself to follow a set of
rules has undeniable utility. Statutized rules can be either binding or
constitutional, but not both.
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